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ABSTRACT 
  When firms contracting with consumers make mistakes, people get 
hurt. Inaccurate billing, misapplied payments, and similar problems 
push lucky consumers into Kafkaesque customer service queues—and 
unlucky ones off the financial cliff. Despite significant regulatory 
interventions, firms contracting with consumers continue to struggle to 
accurately bill customers, update accounts, and process payments. 
Firms largely rely on technology, especially databases and software, to 
discharge these servicing obligations. This technology must 
accommodate firms’ innovations in their contracts, shifting 
governmental regulations, and consumers’ unpredictable behavior. 
Given the complexity of servicing, even when firms invest significantly 
in technology, it will inevitably produce mistakes. When firms skimp 
on their servicing technology, errors that harm consumers become even 
more likely. And even if it were possible to build perfect servicing 
technology, the costs that firms would pass on to consumers may 
outweigh the benefits. The challenge, then, is how to reduce customer 
harm, accepting that perfect servicing is neither possible nor desirable. 
  This Article argues that structural improvements to consumer 
contracts can make them more resilient to errors. Far from being new, 
these structural improvements have long been recognized in contract 
theory. But the resulting theoretical insights have not been applied to 
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modern consumer financial contracts. Specifically, modularity and 
formalities improve resilience by mitigating the complexity of servicing, 
regulation, and consumer behavior. While mitigating complexity may 
reduce errors ex ante, the bigger payoff is in simplifying customer 
redress if and when errors occur. Intervening in the structure of 
consumer financial contracts is an underappreciated tool for achieving 
substantive consumer protection.  
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INTRODUCTION 
It is difficult to pick one instance of bad account data wreaking 
havoc on consumers’ financial lives. There are too many. From the 
financial crisis of 2008 to the COVID-19 pandemic beginning in 2020, 
bad data flourishes in periods of upheaval. Over sixty days in the early 
spring of 2020—as cities, then counties, then states shut down their 
economies to control the spread of the novel coronavirus—the 
unemployment rate surged from 3.5 percent to 14.7 percent.1 An 
astounding 23.1 million workers were out of a job.2 Commentators 
quickly wondered how these people were going to pay their 
 
 1.  BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., U.S. DEP’T OF LAB., THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION—JUNE 
2020 tbl.A-1 (2020), https://www.bls.gov/news.release/archives/empsit_07022020.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/7GZ5-DJA7]. 
 2.  Id. at tbl.A.  
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mortgages.3 The de facto regulators of the home mortgage market4—
the Federal Housing Finance Agency (“FHFA”) along with 
government-sponsored enterprises (“GSEs”) Fannie Mae and Freddie 
Mac5—quickly announced borrowers impacted by the coronavirus 
were eligible for up to twelve months of forbearance.6 But while the 
FHFA and GSEs can announce changes in the mortgage market, they 
are not the entities to which borrowers make their monthly payments. 
Private for-profit firms called servicers are responsible for keeping 
records of borrowers’ accounts, sending statements, accepting 
payments, processing forbearance requests, and, when things go south, 
completing foreclosures. In other words, servicers are largely 
responsible for firm-side performance on the debt contract. Any 
 
 3. See, e.g., Conor Dougherty, Matthew Goldstein & Emily Flitter, Racing To Head Off 
Evictions and Foreclosures, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 18, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/03/18/ 
business/economy/coronavirus-evictions.html [https://perma.cc/2WU5-23GQ] (“The financial 
shock from the coronavirus pandemic threatens the housing security of millions of Americans, 
prompting federal, state and local officials—and even judges and the police—to move quickly to 
ward off foreclosures and evictions.”); Richard Cordray, Opinion, How To Avert Another 
Foreclosure Crisis in the Covid-19 Economic Fallout, WASH. POST (May 11, 2020, 6:00 AM), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/05/11/how-avert-another-foreclosure-crisis-
covid-19-economic-fallout [https://perma.cc/DY7M-JEHS] (“With job losses on that shattering 
scale, recovery won’t happen anytime soon, regardless of the scope of federal stimulus. As people 
fall behind on their bills, including mortgage and rent payments, an important question looms: 
Can we avert another foreclosure crisis?”); Jacob Rosenzweig, Utah Must Stop Evictions and 
Foreclosures Now, SALT LAKE TRIB. (Mar. 25, 2020, 7:00 PM), https://www.sltrib.com/opinion/ 
commentary/2020/03/26/jacob-rosenzweig-utah [https://perma.cc/ GU9S-3Q7U] (“Recognizing 
that tenants and homeowners cannot make monthly payments while unable to work, many 
governments are taking measures to keep people inside for the sake of public safety.”). Several 
municipalities and states have tried to protect renters impacted by the coronavirus from eviction. 
See COVID-19 and Changing Eviction Policies Around the Nation, EVICTION LAB, 
https://evictionlab.org/covid-eviction-policies [https://perma.cc/4TRS-XBR3] (cataloging changes 
to eviction and foreclosure laws in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic). 
 4.  Housing and Economic Recovery Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. § 4511. The relationship 
between the government-sponsored enterprises (“GSEs”) and the federal government remains 
complicated and disputed. See Collins v. Yellen, 141 S. Ct. 1761, 1770–75 (2021). Mercifully, the 
details are inessential for this Article.  
 5.  Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac are federally chartered enterprises that create liquidity in 
the home mortgage market by purchasing mortgages meeting certain standards. Fannie Mae and 
Freddie Mac, FED. HOUS. FIN. AGENCY, https://www.fhfa.gov/about-fannie-mae-freddie-mac 
[https://perma.cc/58CL-6PQA]. Although Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac purchase mortgages, 
other firms collect payments from borrowers and otherwise service the loans. See generally 
FANNIE MAE, SERVICING GUIDE: FANNIE MAE SINGLE FAMILY (2019) (outlining de facto 
regulations for firms doing business with Fannie Mae). Because the GSEs can direct servicers to 
take certain actions, they act as de facto regulators over servicers. 
 6.  About Fannie Mae’s COVID-19 Payment Deferral, FANNIE MAE, 
https://www.fanniemae.com/here-help-homeowners/introducing-covid-19-payment-deferral 
[https://perma.cc/W2B6-25S2]; FANNIE MAE, LL-2020-02, LENDER LETTER 7 (2020), 
https://singlefamily.fanniemae.com/media/22261/display [https://perma.cc/7LQH-W8Y5]. 
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forbearance program is meaningless unless and until these services are 
implemented. 
Servicing typically involves four elements: customer payments, 
software, databases, and people who enter data into the databases. 
Each is imperfect in its own way and in ways that tend to amplify the 
imperfections in the other three. Servicers have largely automated 
their processes through a series of databases and software.7 Even paper 
notices are typically printed and mailed with minimal human 
intervention. More so than anything else, these automated systems are 
made of millions of lines of computer code. The code actually performs 
firms’ contractual obligations and results in a significant, long-term 
capital expense. Any change in the process requires a change in the 
code and therefore in capital investment. 
Fannie Mae’s coronavirus relief instructions mandated servicers 
update their processes—fast.8 Not only did servicers need to train 
personnel to handle requests for relief, but they needed to code the 
new forbearance into their system so borrowers would see it in their 
online accounts, and on statements, all while ensuring borrowers in 
forbearance did not receive the dunning letters and collections calls 
that missing payments would normally trigger.  
Servicers also needed processes for communicating with the 
GSEs. These new rules came down so fast that even Fannie Mae could 
not properly update the database that servicers use to communicate 
with it. Fannie Mae’s system asked servicers to select the reason for the 
forbearance from a drop-down menu,9 but Fannie Mae could not 
program its new coronavirus relief program into that drop-down menu 
in time for the program’s rollout. As a work-around, it instructed 
servicers to select “022, Energy – Environment Costs” if borrowers 
needed a coronavirus forbearance.10 Where servicers previously would 
have selected “022, Energy – Environment Costs,” Fannie Mae 
 
 7.  See infra Part I.B.4. 
 8.  Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. § 5201 (authorizing the 
Department of the Treasury to intervene in the home mortgage industry; it did so through the 
Home Affordable Modification Program, under which it and FHFA would set guidelines about 
how servicers were to modify borrowers’ loans to reduce their payments and, hopefully, prevent 
foreclosure). 
 9.  FANNIE MAE, REPORTING COVID-19 RELATED FORBEARANCE AS PART OF 
REPORTING A DELINQUENT MORTGAGE LOAN TO FANNIE MAE 1 (2020), 
https://singlefamily.fanniemae.com/media/22366/display [https://perma.cc/NWT9-CL5H]. 
 10.  FANNIE MAE, LL-2021-02, LENDER LETTER 4 (2021), 
https://singlefamily.fanniemae.com/media/24891/display [https://perma.cc/CE6V-8X82]. This 
workaround remained in place even a year into the COVID-19 pandemic. See id. at 1. 
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instructed them to select “007, Excessive Obligations.”11 Going 
forward, all aspects of servicers’ processes—each individual customer 
service agent, their training materials, their own computer systems—
would need to know “Energy – Environment Costs” meant 
“coronavirus” and energy issues now belonged under the generically 
named “excessive obligations.”12  
Pause for a moment. Did you have to read the paragraph above 
twice? Did you skim it and hope for the best? Are you bored and 
tempted to stop reading altogether? That confusion, dread, and 
avoidance is now baked into millions of thirty-year mortgages.  
While an extraordinary event triggered these system-wide 
updates, a multitude of little events that require updates to the code 
servicing consumer financial contracts occur every year. Federal 
regulations change, state regulations change, customers move, 
borrowers are called up for active military service,13 natural disasters 
strike,14 and there is an untold number of personal accommodations 
that borrowers seek on obligations.15 Over time and millions of 
accounts, seemingly extraordinary events are not rare.16 The Great 
Recession and the Foreclosure Crisis that followed occurred only a 
decade before the COVID-19 pandemic struck the world. Then as now, 
there were top-down relief efforts that required servicers to update 
their technology to modify loans.17 Few, if any, servicers made the 
necessary updates without significant delay and new harms to 
customers.18 Even when Treasury generously set the bar for servicer 
 
 11.  Id. at 4. 
 12.  See id. 
 13.  See Servicemembers Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 3951–3959 (providing some relief for 
servicemembers called up for active service regarding rent, mortgages and similar obligations). 
 14.  See ALYS COHEN, MARGOT SAUNDERS, ODETTE WILLIAMSON & EMILY GREEN 
CAPLAN, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., OBTAINING MORTGAGE RELIEF FOR VICTIMS OF 
NATURAL DISASTERS: A PRACTICE GUIDE FOR ADVOCATES 4 (2020), https://www.nclc.org/ 
images/pdf/pr-reports/report-mortgage-relief-for-victims-of-disasters.pdf [https://perma.cc/9U72-
UK3L]. 
 15.  See generally Danielle D’Onfro, Smart Contracts and the Illusion of Automated 
Enforcement, 61 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 173 (2020) (discussing the reasons why servicers cannot 
expect business as usual over the life of a loan). 
 16.  See id. at 182. 
 17.  E.g., Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, 12 U.S.C. §§ 5211–5241 
(authorizing the creation of programs like the Home Affordable Mortgage Program (“HAMP”)). 
 18.  See CAL. REINVESTMENT COAL., CHASM BETWEEN WORDS AND DEEDS VI: HAMP IS 
NOT WORKING 1, 4–5 (2010), https://fcic-static.law.stanford.edu/cdn_media/fcic-testimony/2010-
0923-Stein-Exhibit2.pdf [https://perma.cc/GE2R-J5ML] (explaining servicers’ difficulty 
processing the documentation required by the HAMP program and delays in reaching decisions 
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compliance at having errors in no more than 5 percent of all accounts,19 
it found error rates over 20 percent in even the largest and most trusted 
names in the industry.20 Technology problems had created compliance 
problems. 
The takeaway from the past decade of servicing follies has to be 
that midstream adjustments to servicing software are difficult to get 
right. Although technology had made much of the world borderline 
magical, building software is hard. Consider Fannie Mae’s drop-down 
menus—building, never mind populating, even simple databases is 
laborious. Firms undertake this labor because the results are often 
worth it, but the process is far from painless.  
The conflict between the terms of a contract and the software that 
runs it has been most visible in the home mortgage industry, but it 
likely exists across consumer finance. All postpaid contracts, whether 
from medical services providers, water companies, telecom companies, 
credit card issuers, auto lenders, or mortgagees, are consumer finance 
contracts. The consumer incurs an obligation at Time 1 and receives a 
bill at Time 2. This is debt. Some firms may not view their primary 
business as debt servicing, but it is part of their business nonetheless.21 
And if firms are not investing in technology to service this debt as if it 
is a core feature of their businesses, servicing problems are all but 
guaranteed. 
Because building new technology is so costly, many companies 
have significant technical debt.22 Technical debt is a metaphor from the 
 
even after they received the required documentation); David Dayen, The Government Program 
that Failed Homeowners, GUARDIAN (Mar. 30, 2014, 10:00 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/ 
money/2014/mar/30/government-program-save-homes-mortgages-failure-banks [https://perma.cc/ 
TT3Z-52QB] (reporting that servicers “represented the single biggest obstacle to stopping a wave 
of foreclosures”); ALYS COHEN, ARIELLE COHEN & DIANE E. THOMPSON, NAT’L CONSUMER 
L. CTR., AT A CROSSROADS: LESSONS FROM THE HOME AFFORDABLE MODIFICATION 
PROGRAM (HAMP) 31 (2013), https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/ 
loan_mod/hamp-report-2013.pdf [https://perma.cc/7FBD-RP2K] (“Under HAMP, we have 
learned—again and again—that servicers cannot process paperwork. Servicers fail to correctly 
deliver even basic, mandated form documents. Letters are mailed to the wrong address, or not 
sent at all . . . . Servicers routinely misenter information and miscalculate information . . . .”). 
 19.  U.S. DEP’T OF TREAS., MAKING HOME AFFORDABLE: PROGRAM PERFORMANCE 
REPORT THROUGH APRIL 2011, at 37 (2011), https://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/historical/fct/ 
treasury/treasury_hamp_report_201104.pdf [https://perma.cc/V68D-8627]. 
 20.  Id. at 19, 25 (finding Bank of America and Chase miscalculated borrowers’ incomes 22 
percent and 31 percent of the time, respectively). 
 21.  See D’Onfro, supra note 15, at 179. 
 22.  Edith Tom, AybüKe Aurum & Richard Vidgen, An Exploration of Technical Debt, 86 
J. SYS. & SOFTWARE 1498, 1498 (2013) (estimating global technical debt at $500 billion in 2010, 
with the potential to double in five years). 
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financial industry to explain how the presence of a legacy software 
system slows overall technological development.23 It is “the gap 
between the current state of a software system and some hypothesized 
‘ideal’ state in which the system is optimally successful in a particular 
environment”24 and refers to “a backlog of deferred technical 
problems.”25 This technical debt makes firms’ software more difficult 
and more expensive to update over time.26 Yet, firms’ abilities to 
update their software drives their abilities to meet their ongoing 
regulatory obligations. 
Software also drives firms’ abilities to meet their contractual 
obligations.27 In consumer finance, business innovation is contract 
innovation—changes to the terms of the contracts offered to 
consumers. Contract innovations require firms to update their software 
just as regulatory innovations do. Because the terms of many contracts 
are so interlocked, even small changes may require pervasive updates 
in servicing software. When contract innovation outpaces technology 
investments, errors follow. 
The last decade has also shown many firms either cannot or will 
not align their technology with their contractual and regulatory 
obligations before customer harm occurs. Firms face neither legal nor 
market nor reputational pressure to do so.28 As long as servicing 
 
 23.  Ward Cunningham coined the term “technical debt” in 1992, explaining,  
Shipping first time code is like going into debt. A little debt speeds development so 
long as it is paid back promptly with a rewrite. . . . The danger occurs when the debt is 
not repaid. Every minute spent on not-quite-right code counts as interest on that debt. 
Entire engineering organizations can be brought to a stand-still under the debt load of 
an unconsolidated implementation, object-oriented or otherwise. 
Ward Cunningham, Address at the Seventh Annual Conference on Object-Oriented 
Programming Systems, Languages, and Applications: The WyCash Portfolio Management 
System (Mar. 26, 1992) (transcript available at http://c2.com/doc/oopsla92.html [https://perma.cc/ 
P89D-WQAB]).  
 24.  Nanette Brown, Yuanfang Cai, Yuepu Guo, Rick Kazman, Miryung Kim, Philippe 
Kruchten, Erin Lim, Alan MacCormack, Robert Nord, Ipek Ozkaya, Raghvinder Sangwan, 
Carolyn Seaman, Kevin Sullivan & Nico Zazworka, Managing Technical Debt in Software-Reliant 
Systems, in FOSER ’10: PROCEEDINGS OF THE FSE/SDP WORKSHOP ON FUTURE OF SOFTWARE 
ENGINEERING RESEARCH, at 47, 48 (ACM Press, 2010). 
 25.  Richard Torkar, Pau Minoves & Janina Garrigós, Adopting Free/Libre/Open Source 
Software Practices, Techniques and Methods for Industrial Use, 12 J. ASS’N INFO. SYS. 88, 99 
(2011). 
 26.  Tom, Aurum & Vidgen, supra note 22, at 1499. 
 27.  But see Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract 
Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 544 (2003) (disputing whether contract law governs contracts in which a 
firm sells to an individual on the grounds that these contracts “are primarily regulated by 
consumer protection law, real property law (most leases), and the securities laws”). 
 28.  See infra Part II. 
D'ONFRO IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 11/9/2021  10:57 AM 
2021] ERROR-RESILIENT CONSUMER CONTRACTS 549 
platforms remain hobbled by technical debt, subpar servicing will 
abound. Regulating servicing outcomes could theoretically create the 
necessary incentives for firms to maintain their servicing systems, but 
it has not yet done so despite years of opportunity.29 The problems with 
ex post regulation of servicing outcomes are akin to the problem of 
technical debt: fixing a problem can be more difficult than preventing 
one.  
Improving servicing must start with the contracts that create the 
relationships between firms and consumers.30 These contracts need to 
account for technology as it exists. Focusing on the contract-technology 
interface is a fundamental shift in thinking about consumer protection. 
U.S. consumer protection law has hesitated to intervene directly in the 
bargains that consumers and firms strike. Instead, the law tends to 
prefer intervening in the contracting process, often with mandatory 
disclosures of problematic terms in lieu of limitations on those terms.31 
With mixed success, disclosures attempt to protect consumers as they 
choose to enter into contracts.32 But helping consumers choose better 
contracts accomplishes little if firms fail to perform their obligations 
under the contracts. Improved firm performance will not happen 
without contracts that better interface with servicing technology and 
that create lifelines for when the inevitable errors occur. 
Accepting that technical debt is not going anywhere and that 
contracts will sometimes get ahead of the technology that services 
them, this Article turns to the structure of the contract and explores 
whether it can be made more functional given these constraints. It finds 
two points of entry. The first is in the modularity of the contract. 
Modularity refers to the extent to which the terms of the contract are 
dependent on each other. In highly modular contracts, errors are 
 
 29.  See infra Part II.B.1. 
 30.  Despite their dependency on software, the contracts at the heart of this Article are not 
“smart contracts,” but their terms are nevertheless manifest in code. 
 31.  See Jean Braucher, Form and Substance in Consumer Financial Protection, 7 BROOK. J. 
COR. FIN. & COM. L. 107, 108–10 (2012) (tracing the dominance of regulation through disclosure 
regimes). 
 32.  See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help? Evaluating the 
Recommendations of the ALI’s “Principles of the Law of Software Contracts,” 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 
165, 168 (2011) [hereinafter Marotta-Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help?]; Lauren E. Willis, 
Performance-Based Consumer Law, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. 1309, 1321–26 (2015). See generally 
Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Does Contract Disclosure Matter?, 168 J. INST. & THEORETICAL 
ECON. 94 (2012) (studying the relationships between mandating disclosure and contract 
readership, understanding, and purchase decisions). 
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contained, whereas in highly interconnected contracts, errors 
metastasize quickly.  
The second point of entry is in formalities: acts that contracting 
parties must perform to avoid a penalty set by the formality.33 
Formalities regulate the contract itself instead of the substance of the 
contract, although they may ultimately shape the substance of the 
contract. Modern formalities are often structured as disclosure and 
filing requirements. In intellectual property and secured transactions, 
the formalities historically required the filing of literal forms.34 The 
Securities and Exchange Commission has an extensive list of forms that 
firms must use to access and provide disclosures to the capital 
markets.35 There, the formality is not the information disclosed, but the 
act of disclosing particular categories of information in proscribed 
formats. The formality is the act of standardizing and publishing data.  
Writing about copyright, Professor Christopher Sprigman 
describes these filing requirements as “procedural mechanisms . . . that 
helped to maintain copyright’s traditional balance between providing 
private incentives to authors and preserving a robust stock of public 
domain works from which future creators could draw.”36 He further 
explains “these formalities created data about the existence and 
duration of copyright for the work in question, and about who owned 
the copyright.”37 The formalities that follow real estate transfers and 
secured transactions are similar: they produce data about particular 
rights and, in so doing, help parties who interact with those rights in the 
future understand their scope. Indeed, in the commercial lending 
space, some commentators have argued the formalities shield some 
assets from encumbrances, thereby preserving their value for the 
benefit of noncreditors.38 That is, these formalities serve the same 
functions in debt that Sprigman identifies in copyright. 
 
 33.  See Eric A. Posner, Norms, Formalities, and the Statute of Frauds: A Comment, 144 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1971, 1981 (1996) (explaining that formalities “restrict[] freedom of action”); see also 
Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic Theory of 
Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 124 (1989) (discussing how legal formalities can channel parties 
into certain behaviors). 
 34.  Here, the form is the grown-up version of a worksheet. 
 35.  See Forms List, SEC, https://www.sec.gov/forms [https://perma.cc/H8AV-769L] (listing 
and explaining the dozens of forms that firms must use as they interact with investors and report 
on their dealings to the Securities and Exchange Commission). 
 36.  Christopher Sprigman, Reform(aliz)ing Copyright, 57 STAN. L. REV. 485, 487 (2004). 
 37.  Id. 
 38.  See Melissa B. Jacoby & Edward J. Janger, Tracing Equity: Realizing and Allocating 
Value in Chapter 11, 96 TEX. L. REV. 673, 696–706 (2018) (“The secured creditor is not . . . entitled 
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In contract, the formalities are things like the statute of frauds’ 
requirements that agreements be in writing, signed, and, historically, 
sealed. Parties can and do form extensive agreements that fail to satisfy 
these formalities, but they cannot reliably enforce them at law.39 
Contract formalities such as the statute of frauds and the consideration 
doctrine are about preventing fraud40 and its cousin, misunderstanding. 
Formalities help the parties, and courts, speak the same language. 
Although they cannot eliminate fraud, they can reduce it.41  
The historical trend has been for states and courts to ease up on 
formalities in contract law.42 This is a mistake. The desirability of any 
particular formality may vary over time.43 That changes in business 
norms make some formalities less desirable over time does not speak 
to the usefulness of formalities.44 
At the height of the Foreclosure Crisis, Professor David Dana 
argued it was wrong to dismiss the formalities that continue to 
accompany home mortgages as mere formalities.45 In his view, 
mortgage formalities matter for three distinct reasons: First, they may 
help homeowners facing foreclosure to rightfully stay in their homes.46 
Second, “the formalities express[] the significant value that the home 
serves in people’s lives and the vitality of communities.”47 That is, 
anything other than a strict application of formalities “communicates 
this message: the law will hold the ‘little people’ to strict compliance 
regarding their legal obligations under mortgages and notes, while it 
excludes large financial institutions like Chase and Citibank from their 
 
to the value of proceeds unless the creditor can satisfy the state law and bankruptcy law tracing 
requirements.”). 
 39.  Parties to agreements that fail to satisfy formalities sometimes find relief in equitable 
doctrines like quantum meruit, but other times have no remedy in law or equity. See Charles 
Silver, Unloading the Lodestar: Toward a New Fee Award Procedure, 70 TEX. L. REV. 865, 880 
n.61 (1992). 
 40.  Posner, supra note 33, at 1982. 
 41.  See id. at 1977. Posner argues that “[t]he purpose of contract formalities such as the 
Statute of Frauds is to prevent people from defrauding victims with whom they do not necessarily 
have a contractual relationship.” Id. at 1971. 
 42.  See David A. Dana, Why Mortgage “Formalities” Matter, 24 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 
505, 506–07 (2012). 
 43.  Posner, supra note 33, at 1983 (explaining that “formalities may be intrinsically 
unstable” as courts attempting substantive justice weaken formalities when courts perceive 
parties to be manipulating the formalities). 
 44.  Id. at 1982. 
 45.  Dana, supra note 42. 
 46.  Id. at 507. 
 47.  Id. 
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legal obligations when they are inconvenient.”48 Dana argues we 
should all feel “normative discomfort” with this message49—he is right. 
Third, and finally, he argues strict adherence to formalities, and 
perhaps even additional formalities, might “create an incentive for 
more care” in the processes that caused the most customer harm during 
the Foreclosure Crisis.50  
Dana’s three purposes partially overlap with Professor Lon 
Fuller’s 1941 theoretical framework in which he identified three 
functions of formalities: evidentiary, cautionary, and channeling.51 In 
their evidentiary function, as the name suggests, formalities evince that 
the agreement exists.52 In their cautionary function, which Fuller 
sometimes calls the deterrent function, formalities “induc[e] the 
circumspective frame of mind appropriate” for parties, making a 
significant commitment.53 Finally, in their channeling function, 
formalities nudge the parties’ intentions into objective manifestations 
upon which courts and others can rely.54 Using an image from jurist 
Rudolf von Jhering, Fuller explains the channeling function is the 
stamp that turns a lump of metal into a coin.55 Professors Ian Ayres and 
Robert Gertner adopt and expand on Fuller’s framework, updating a 
functional analysis of contract formalities with a more modern 
understanding of contracts.56 
Taking modularity and formalities together, this Article’s main 
contribution is to theorize how the structure of consumer contracts can 
make them more resilient to errors. As numerous commentators have 
noted, contracts between firms and consumers differ in many ways 
from contracts bargained between equally sophisticated parties.57 
Professors Alan Schwartz and Robert Scott go so far as to suggest these 
contracts were the subject of consumer protection law more than the 
 
 48.  Id. at 508. 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Lon L. Fuller, Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799, 800–01 (1941). 
 52.  Id. at 800; see also infra Part III.B.1. 
 53.  Fuller, supra note 51, at 800; see also infra Part III.B.2. 
 54.  Fuller, supra note 51, at 801; see also infra Part III.B.3. 
 55.  Fuller, supra note 51, at 801 (discussing Jhering). 
 56.  Ayres & Gertner, supra note 33, at 123–25. 
 57.  Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66 
STAN. L. REV. 545, 558–60 (2014) (discussing how consumer contracts are procedurally different 
from bargained contracts); Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 139, 145–47 
(1970) (same). 
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law of contract itself.58 But using contract theory to interpret consumer 
contracts not only deepens our understanding of consumer contracts, 
it also enriches contract theory. While consumer financial contracts are 
the focus here, some of the insights apply to contracts broadly. 
This Article’s second contribution is to show formalities can be a 
bridge between the contract and the technology that interprets the 
contract. Where prior theory has focused on formalities’ key role in 
judicial interpretation of contracts,59 this Article uses contract theory 
to demonstrate they are useful in contract performance. Namely, for 
consumers, formalities may facilitate servicing.  
The mechanism by which formalities can improve servicing is 
admittedly counterintuitive. After all, formalities are supposed to be 
quirky ceremonial appendages to contracts, whereas servicing is 
primarily an automated process of moving information among 
databases. But formalities are well suited for the marriage of contract 
and technology found in most consumer financial contracts. Almost by 
definition, formalities produce more standardized data. Formalities 
take complex contractual arrangements and simplify them into their 
most essential stakes. Just as formalities provide evidence for courts 
interpreting contracts in formats that make sense to the court, they do 
the same for the computer systems that perform the contracts. At the 
same time, formalities act on the parties drafting the contracts by 
incentivizing deliberation about how computers (or a court) will read 
the forms. They also facilitate enforcement if and when a party 
breaches its obligations. 
This Article’s third contribution is to show contract formalities are 
an essential regulatory tool in consumer contracts. Because consumers 
are ill-equipped to privately enforce consumer financial contracts 
against firms, regulatory enforcement is the game. Regulatory 
enforcement is impossible to disentangle from contract law because 
state and federal regulatory regimes look to the contracts struck 
between firms and consumers for much of their regulatory content. The 
focus tends to be on whether consumers received what they bargained 
for, rather than on setting price terms or prohibiting specific products. 
Formalities make the mutual obligation of consumer financial 
contracts obvious and in so doing, bolster their legitimacy. 
This Article proceeds in four Parts. Part I explains servicing as 
firm-side performance of consumer financial contracts. Because this 
 
 58.  See Schwartz & Scott, supra note 27. 
 59.  Ayres & Gertner, supra note 33, at 125. 
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Article contemplates consumer financial contracts broadly, it will 
necessarily omit many of the details specific to particular kinds of 
consumer financial contracts. The goal of this Part is only to provide 
enough background information on consumer financial contracts to 
facilitate later discussion. Part II explains why standard market and 
regulatory tools have failed to promote accurate servicing of consumer 
financial contracts. This Part explains the urgency of experimenting 
with structural tools like modularity and formalities. Part III builds the 
central theoretical framework of the paper, laying out two structural 
improvements—modularity and formalities—that would make 
contracts more error resilient. In addition to potentially reducing the 
rate of servicing errors, these formalities would make the inevitable 
errors easier to resolve. Part IV then explores the implications and 
limitations of this theoretical framework. 
I. SERVICING AS PERFORMANCE 
This Part broadly describes consumer financial contracts and 
firms’ postformation obligations to consumers under those contracts. 
Part I.A lays out the basic consumer financial contract. Part I.B then 
fills in the details that are common to most consumer financial 
contracts. Finally, Part I.C describes three additional complexities that 
occur regularly in consumer financial contracts but are not the same 
kind of core feature described in Part I.B. Taken together, they provide 
the first half of the story of how consumer financial contracts became 
a system of unilateral obligations.  
A. The Basic Consumer Financial Contract 
In the basic consumer financial contract, the consumer gets a good 
or a service at Time 1 in exchange for a promise to pay at Time 2. When 
there is a time lag between when consumers receive the good or service 
and when they pay for it, the contract creates a debt from the 
consumers to the company. In this way, all postpaid contracts are debt 
contracts.60 Accordingly, all postpaid contracts are financial contracts. 
 
 60.  Postpaid contracts as distinct from prepaid contracts are most visible in the mobile 
phone market. There, customers who can “pass” a credit check receive offers to enter into longer-
term contracts with carriers that offer them flexible services that they pay for at the end of the 
month. Since consumers use services before paying for them, the consumer is effectively receiving 
credit from the carrier. This is in contrast to customers who cannot “pass” a credit check and 
therefore cannot qualify for a postpaid contract. Since firms view the risk that these consumers 
would use services that they could not then pay for at the end of the month as intolerably high, 
these consumers must prepurchase minutes or other services. In theory, consumers’ abilities to 
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The financial part of a contract may be attached to sale and service 
terms that are more salient to consumers at the time of contract 
formation. For example, a consumer in need of mobile phone service 
is likely more focused on the terms of the phone service—minutes, data 
plan, coverage maps, and overall price—than on terms like how their 
phone company will apply their payments and what happens should 
they miss a payment. Nevertheless, the terms that govern the 
mechanics of the relationship between the consumer and the 
company—the servicing terms—are an integral part of contract 
performance. A phone company performs its contractual obligations 
to postpaid consumers both by providing phone service and by 
accepting and crediting ongoing payments from consumers. These 
obligations are contractual insofar as they arise from a relationship 
created by a contract,61 even if the contract leaves the details to the 
discretion of the firm or is silent about them altogether. Phone 
customers perform their contractual obligations by making payments 
to their phone companies and adhering to any applicable terms specific 
to the phone service. 
Viewing servicing as outside the scope of the contract would 
render consumer contracts an anomaly within contracts. Servicing is 
performance. Consider its analog in a sales contract: A contracts to sell 
one widget per month to B for $100 each. They agree A will deliver the 
widget on the first of the month, and B will pay by check at the time of 
delivery. If A delivers the first widget but refuses to accept B’s 
payment, A cannot then send B a bill for $125—the original sale price 
plus a late fee—and withhold future deliveries until B pays the 
additional fee. Here, A would be in breach for not accepting payment 
in the agreed form and for failing to deliver the widgets in later months. 
The terms dictating the method of payment are as much a part of the 
contract as the price terms. These terms impose obligations on the 
buyer to follow them and on the seller to accept them. Servicing 
consumer contracts is rarely this simple, but the idea is the same: 
 
continue using the carriers’ services stop when they use up their prepurchased credits. Such 
prepaid arrangements are effectively short-term loans from the customer to the firm. 
  There is a narrow category of consumer financial contracts that are not loans from a 
company to a consumer. In these, the consumer pays a company upfront, and then that company 
provides them with a financial service based on their upfront payment. Typically, these contracts 
convert consumers’ money into transferrable electronic funds. Prepaid debit cards, electronic gift 
cards, and payments apps are examples of such. As this category matures, it may incur some of 
the same difficulties as do more traditional consumer financial contracts. For now, these contracts 
are beyond the scope of this Article. 
 61.  See supra note 27 and accompanying text. 
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processing payments according to the contracts is performance of the 
contract. 
B. Understanding the Basic Contract 
Having described the most basic features of consumer financial 
contracts, it is time to talk about the details. These details are both 
descriptive and theoretical.  
1. Contract as Product.  The first feature is that consumers rarely 
have any opportunity to negotiate the terms of the contract.62 In lieu of 
negotiation, consumers may be selecting from a menu of contracts 
offered by a firm. The consumer must accept the terms of a particular 
contract as a condition of purchasing a good or using a service.63 
Consumers may have a menu of choices from a single firm, but they 
have no option to customize a consumer financial contract to their 
needs. The terms of the contract are functionally part of the product.64 
These are adhesion contracts.65 Their departures from the norms of 
negotiated contracts are well covered in the literature66; the literature 
 
 62.  Friedrich Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion—Some Thoughts About Freedom of Contract, 
43 COLUM. L. REV. 629, 632 (1943); Russell Korobkin, Bounded Rationality, Standard Form 
Contracts, and Unconscionability, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1203, 1204 (2003). 
 63.  See Kessler, supra note 62 (explaining that when parties have a stronger negotiating 
position because either they have a monopoly or their competitors prefer to use the same terms, 
companies will offer standard contracts that the would-be purchaser must take or leave); Joshua 
Fairfield, Smart Contracts, Bitcoin Bots, and Consumer Protection, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 
ONLINE 35, 42 (2014) (“Somewhere in the shift from dickered, black letter law-negotiated 
contracting to non-dickered, standardized, mass-market consumer contracting, the ability of 
consumers to negotiate their own contract terms vanished.”). 
 64.  See Korobkin, supra note 62, at 1206 (“Terms that govern the contractual relationship 
between buyers and sellers are attributes of the product in question, just as are the product’s price 
and its physical and functional characteristics.”); James Gibson, Vertical Boilerplate, 70 WASH. & 
LEE L. REV. 161, 168 (2013) (“[A] boilerplate term is merely a product feature—no different from 
price . . . .”). 
 65.  Edwin W. Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance Policy, 33 HARV. L. REV. 198, 
222 (1919) (introducing the concept of adhesion contracts to the literature and explaining that the 
party seeking the contract has “little choice as to its terms” and must adhere to them).  
 66.  K. N. Llewellyn, The Standardization of Commercial Contracts in English and 
Continental Law. By O. Prausnitz, 52 HARV. L. REV. 700, 701 (1939) (book review) (“[W]hen 
contracts are produced by the printing press, with the fountain pen used not for recording thought 
but for authentication, the adequacy of the general law for filling gaps in the conscious bargain is 
flatly negatived . . . .”); Alfred W. Meyer, Contracts of Adhesion and the Doctrine of Fundamental 
Breach, 50 VA. L. REV. 1178, 1178 (1964) (“The vast majority of today’s ‘contracts’ are 
standardized forms, the counterpart of mass production and mass distribution of goods and 
services.”). 
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praising their efficiency is also thick.67 For this Article, it matters that 
the product is the contract, even if the contract is barely visible to the 
consumer.  
Even where companies offer consumers a menu of contract 
options, it is not obvious that firms would offer variation in the 
servicing terms because these are unlikely to be salient to consumers. 
As Professor Russell Korobkin observes, even rational consumers 
operate at best as “boundedly rational,” which limits the number of 
attributes that they can simultaneously weigh in decision-making.68 
Given these limitations, rational consumers ignore many attributes. 
Servicing terms live in the fine print, and it is almost a trope now to 
point out consumers do not read the fine print.69 Indeed, it may be a 
stretch to assume consumers could understand these terms even if they 
wanted to do so.70 
2. Standardization.  Consumer contracts’ second defining feature 
is that they are standardized or standardizable along two dimensions.71 
First, firms may offer all consumers the same terms.72 Second, terms 
 
 67.  See, e.g., Llewellyn, supra note 66, at 701 (“Nothing can approach in speed and sanity of 
readaptation the machinery of standard forms of a trade and for a line of trade, built to meet the 
particular needs of that trade.”); Kessler, supra note 62, at 631–32 (“Standardized contracts have 
thus become an important means of excluding or controlling the ‘irrational factor’ in 
litigation . . . . [T]hey are a true reflection of the spirit of our time with its hostility to irrational 
factors in the judicial process, and they belong in the same category as codifications and 
restatements.”); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 HARV. 
L. REV. 1173, 1223 (1983) (“Standardization is valuable; it reduces transaction costs. The 
possibilities transcend mere standardization, however, for firms can draft the terms so as to 
stabilize the incidents of doing business.”); Edith R. Warkentine, Beyond Unconscionability: The 
Case for Using Knowing Assent as the Basis for Analyzing Unbargained-for Terms in Standard 
Form Contracts, 31 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 469, 472 (2008) (“Courts seem to enforce most terms in 
standard form contracts because of judges’ underlying belief in the importance of such contracts 
in commerce.”). 
 68.  Korobkin, supra note 62, at 1206. 
 69.  See, e.g., Yannis Bakos, Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & David R. Trossen, Does Anyone 
Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Standard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3 
(2014) (finding only 1 to 2 of every 1,000 consumers shopping online even access the terms and 
conditions).  
 70.  Id. at 9; see also Jeff Sovern, Elayne E. Greenberg, Paul F. Kirgis & Yuxiang Liu, 
Whimsy Little Contracts with Unexpected Consequences: An Empirical Analysis of Consumer 
Understanding of Arbitration Agreements, 75 MD. L. REV. 1, 4–5 (2015) (documenting low 
consumer comprehension of arbitration agreements in credit card contracts). 
 71.  See Joshua A. T. Fairfield, The Cost of Consent: Optimal Standardization in the Law of 
Contract, 58 EMORY L.J. 1401, 1405 (2009) (explaining two kinds of standardization). 
 72.  There are degrees of standardization here. Firms may offer all consumers within a 
particular group the same terms and offer other groups different terms. See Robert A. Hillman & 
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 
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may be standardized across drafters.73 For example, all software license 
agreements may contain functionally similar arbitration clauses even 
though different firms ostensibly draft the agreements.74 These 
agreements may offer all consumers the same terms regardless of any 
individual consumer’s preferences, even if customization may make 
that particular contract more efficient.75 Both kinds of standardization 
tend to reduce information costs.76 
Problems arise when the level of standardization does not match 
expectations. For example, if a firm purchases servicing software 
expecting its contracts to have mostly standardized servicing terms, it 
may inadvertently breach the contracts whose idiosyncratic terms 
make the contract incompatible with the software. Similarly, 
consumers may breach financial contracts if the rules of those contracts 
require consumers to take unexpected steps to perform their 
obligations. For example, if consumers expect to be able to make 
payments by personal checks at no additional cost, they may be 
unpleasantly surprised if a single firm charges a check processing fee. 
The consumers’ surprise may escalate if they incur late fees when the 
firm with idiosyncratic servicing terms rejects their otherwise timely 
payments for failure to include a check-processing fee. 
Notwithstanding this tendency towards standardization, consumer 
financial contracts are fragmented because they occur across diverse 
industries subject to differing, and at times even incompatible, 
regulations, customs, and consumer expectations. This means any 
consumer must know and abide by different rules for economically 
similar transactions. Consider the bills. That pile of mail—or email—
comes from diverse senders and may have equally diverse rules for 
payment and near-term consequences for nonpayment. Yet, at a higher 
level of generality, the bills are all requests for payment on little debt 
agreements. And if the consumer fails to make these payments, they 
 
471 (2002) (explaining that the internet has facilitated tailoring business offers to particular 
groups of consumers). 
 73.  See Fairfield, supra note 71, at 1403–04 n.5. 
 74.  See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & Robert Taylor, Set in Stone: Change and Innovation 
in Consumer Standard-Form Contracts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 240, 244 (2013) (finding that between 
2003 and 2010 arbitration clauses became standard in end-user license agreements). 
 75.  See W. David Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking 
Power, 84 HARV. L. REV. 529, 554 (1970) (“A buyer for whom the products on such a market are 
essential buys them at prices and with other terms of sale that are adhesive, since he has no 
reasonable choice but to buy and . . . to pay the prices and accept the other terms set by the 
market.”).  
 76.  Fairfield, supra note 71, at 1403. 
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will land in collections—the great unifier of bills. Consumer contracts 
are often heterogenous, but both consumers and some firms may 
interact with them as if they were more standardized than they are. 
This mismatch creates opportunities for errors on both sides.  
3. Automation.  Companies have largely automated their 
performance of their financial obligations under consumer contracts. 
Consumers increasingly make their payments electronically.77 
Servicing software applies these payments to consumers’ accounts 
according to the terms of the contract. Assuming the consumer 
continues to make right-sized, on-time payments, there is little need for 
human intervention. Companies’ ability to comply with their 
contractual obligations then relies on the accuracy of their servicing 
software.78 
Two categories of consumers prevent companies from fully 
automating their servicing performance. The first are those that do not 
make electronic payments. These consumers may pay in cash, by check, 
by returning a coupon with credit or debit card information, or by 
calling the company. Although some automation via ATM machines 
and scanning technology is possible, it is not yet as smooth as electronic 
payments, and in some cases, it will require human intervention to 
translate the payment into data in the company’s servicing software. 
Anywhere there is human intervention, there is some risk of error, 
whether from on-off, fat-fingered data entry or from training lags and 
other systemic problems. 
The second are those whose payments interact with consumer 
protection laws. There are several layers of overlapping legal 
frameworks that can supersede companies’ contractual relationship 
with consumers.79 Some of these frameworks, notably consumer 
bankruptcy, functionally prevent companies from automating servicing 
by creating customer-specific obligations that contradict the 
standardized terms on which companies build their servicing software. 
For example, a company that normally does not accept checks from 
consumers may need to accept checks covering consumers’ payments 
if that is how the consumers’ bankruptcy trustee chooses to make 
 
 77.  Zhai Yun Tan, Is It Time To Write Off Checks?, NPR (Mar. 3, 2016, 9:41 AM), 
https://www.npr.org/2016/03/03/468890515/is-it-time-to-write-off-checks [https://perma.cc/NK8K-
A5LF]. 
 78.  See infra Part II.C. 
 79.  See D’Onfro, supra note 15, at 186–89. 
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payments.80 Similarly, the Servicemembers Civil Relief Act,81 which 
caps the interest rate on certain debt at 6 percent82 while blocking some 
repossessions,83 nonjudicial foreclosures,84 and lease terminations,85 
may require companies either to remove some consumers from its 
automated systems or to develop supplemental automation protocols 
to handle consumers entitled to these protections. Determining the 
more cost-effective path will depend on the company. 
In sum, automation is increasingly the norm in consumer financial 
contracts, but it is not, nor can it be, pervasive. 
4. Data Management.  For any consumer financial contract, 
roughly five separate databases manage each customer’s account. 
These are separate systems that sometimes work together smoothly 
and sometimes barely communicate with each other. The number of 
systems that perform the firm-side obligations of consumer financial 
contracts creates opportunities for discrepancies. 
Once the firm applies the payment, it must update the customers’ 
accounts in its main ledger, called the system of record (“SOR”).86 
Historically, SORs contained data such as “payments, charge activity, 
and interest rates as well as the consumer’s name, address, credit 
history and any other contact information the lender might have.”87 A 
customer’s account in a SOR is supposed to be the official record of a 
customer’s account with the firm.88 SORs serve at least four additional 
purposes. First, they provide a baseline that determines how to bill and 
apply the customer’s next payment. Second, they provide records that 
customer service representatives need should the customer call with 
questions. Third, they represent the firm’s assets—both as assets that 
the firm might sell and for accounting purposes. And fourth, they are 
 
 80.  Id. at 178. 
 81.  50 U.S.C. §§ 3901–4043. 
 82.  Id. § 3937. 
 83.  Id. § 3952. 
 84.  Id. § 3953. 
 85.  Id. § 3955. 
 86.  Dalié Jiménez, Dirty Debts Sold Dirt Cheap, 52 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 41, 49 (2015). 
 87.  John Tonetti, Collections Program Manager, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Remarks at 
FTC & CFPB Roundtable on Data Integrity in Debt Collection: Life of a Debt 63–64 (June 6, 
2013) (transcript available at https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_events/71120/ 
life-debt-roundtable-transcript.pdf [https://perma.cc/LAE9-JL72]). 
 88.  Jiménez, supra note 86. 
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part of the documentation that firms must produce to demonstrate 
compliance with a web of state and federal regulations.89 
Many companies maintain a second database, the customer 
relationship management system (“CRM”), documenting additional 
details about consumers’ interactions with the firm.90 For example, the 
CRM memorializes customer calls to the firm, complaints, and other 
interactions with customer service.91 Since SORs do not typically 
record this kind of color, one can only see the whole relationship 
between a firm and a consumer by reading the SOR and CRM 
together.92 
A third system handles internal collections activity. This system 
records data about customers who fail to make payments to the firm.93 
It memorializes firms’ efforts to collect the debt. While it has the same 
kinds of data as the SOR and CRM do, data does not usually flow from 
the collections system back into the SOR or CRM unless and until the 
customer brings the account current.94 The logic of these systems 
means when the customer brings their account current, data recorded 
in the collections system is often lost or becomes difficult to access.95  
If the customer does not bring their account current, the firm 
usually charges off the account after several months.96 After charge off, 
the customer’s account moves to a fourth system, a recovery system, 
which memorializes external collections efforts.97 This system records 
bare-bones data about the customer, the account balance, activity by 
third-party debt collectors, and any communication between the firm 
and the customer.98 Some firms include data from their internal 
collections system in their recovery systems, but others start fresh.99 
Third-party debt collectors typically rely on this system, not the SOR, 
 
 89.  See, e.g., CFPB EXAMINATION PROCEDURES: REVERSE MORTGAGE SERVICING 11, 14 
(2020), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/cfpb_supervision-and-examination-manual.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/FRC2-2V7T] (directing examiners to look at “primary record system” of various 
debt servicers).  
 90.  Tonetti, supra note 87, at 49–50. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. 
 93.  Id. at 65.  
 94.  Id. at 66.  
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Id.; see also Jiménez, supra note 86, at 52 (explaining that banking regulations set the 
timeline for firms to charge off certain products). 
 97.  Jiménez, supra note 86, at 52; Tonetti, supra note 87, at 66–67. 
 98.  Tonetti, supra note 87, at 66–67. 
 99.  Id. at 66. 
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for their collections activities.100 This system is also the source of data 
that appears on any regulatory notices that the customer receives 
during the collections process.101 
Once a third-party debt collector takes over debts, a fifth system, 
the debt collector’s own SOR, begins tracking the account.102 This fifth 
system tracks payments that the customer makes to the debt collector. 
Data from the first three systems do not reliably flow into this system.103 
At this point, the accuracy of any SOR will depend in part on how 
regularly it interfaces with the other SORs managing the account. 
Given the logistical complexities of keeping five systems across at least 
two separate companies up to date,104 once an account is in collections, 
it is hard to say there is a definitive record of the customer’s 
performance of their contractual obligations.105 
Between the coders needed to automate most of servicing and the 
segment that resists automation, there are many humans involved in 
servicing. No one is immune to making typos. As a result, everything 
these humans do is an opportunity for mistakes.106  
Moreover, because servicing is not necessarily a metric on which 
firms compete, we might expect firms to minimize their investments in 
the personnel working in servicing functions.107 If these positions are 
not structured jobs that the firm values, firms may be less able to attract 
and retain talent, which in turn may increase the risk of errors. These 
errors may be direct mistakes that arise from inexpert coding, or they 
may be errors that arise as staffing shortages create maintenance 
backlogs.  
 
 100.  See id. at 67–68. 
 101.  See id. 
 102.  Id. at 69. If the right to collect the debt is resold, additional SORs at each of the 
subsequent debt collectors may track the debt. Jiménez, supra note 86, at 50. 
 103.  Tonetti, supra note 87, at 69. 
 104.  See id. at 72. 
 105.  Id. at 51–52. 
 106.  One can imagine a coder at a tech start-up is the talent whereas a coder in the bowels of 
a bank is a transaction cost. This distinction does not reflect any meaningful difference in the skills 
involved in their jobs, but rather the focus of their companies. Pay, benefits, and stability may 
counteract some of these varying perceptions. 
 107.  Adequate staffing has long been a problem in the mortgage servicing industry. See 
DIANE E. THOMPSON, NAT’L CONSUMER L. CTR., WHY SERVICERS FORECLOSE WHEN THEY 
SHOULD MODIFY AND OTHER PUZZLES OF SERVICER BEHAVIOR 28–29 (2009), 
https://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/pr-reports/report-servicers-modify.pdf [https://perma.cc/6VS8-
KZGL] (describing historical staffing challenges and solutions that have been suggested). 
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The same dynamic may appear in the customer service 
departments of these institutions. By and large, the customer service 
representatives with whom consumers interact are entry-level 
employees working out of call centers.108 Customer service jobs are 
functionally data entry jobs since call center employees have little, if 
any, discretion to assist consumers beyond what their computer 
systems direct them to do. This manual data entry, though, is itself an 
opportunity for errors in the SOR and other systems.109  
In the absence of employee discretion, there is an absence of 
people who can fix mistakes once they occur. This phenomenon is 
apparent in the stories of borrowers seeking mortgage modifications 
during the Great Recession. Unable to remedy even small data entry 
problems in the servicer’s system, customer service employees instead 
requested borrowers resubmit their modification applications.110 In 
other words, constraints on servicing based on employees’ discretion 
force those employees to function as extensions of the servicing 
software, rather than as autonomous agents searching for an optimal 
solution for their firm and their customer. In this way, even a small 
servicing error may be difficult for consumers to cure. Given the 
number of records systems in play, it is easy for errors to metastasize.  
As the next subsection will show, firms have not drafted their 
contracts to mitigate the potential harm of these overlapping servicing 
systems. Instead, the terms of the contracts exacerbate the weaknesses 
of the technological systems. 
5. Term Complexity.  The servicing terms of consumer financial 
contracts are often highly interconnected.111 That is, what happens 
 
 108.  See Customer Service Representatives, BUREAU OF LAB. STAT., https://www.bls.gov/ooh/ 
office-and-administrative-support/customer-service-representatives.htm [https://perma.cc/7YSC-
N2HX] (last updated Apr. 9, 2021) (estimating customer service representatives earn on average 
$35,830 per year and the position requires only a high school diploma and little on-the-job 
training).  
 109.  See Raymond R. Panko, What We Don’t Know About Spreadsheet Errors Today: The 
Facts, Why We Don’t Believe Them, and What We Need To Do 3 (Feb. 2, 2016) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1602.02601.pdf [https://perma.cc/M96J-QXB4] (studying the 
rate of data entry errors in spreadsheets).  
 110.  See Paul Kiel & Olga Pierce, Homeowner Questionnaire Shows Banks Violating 
Government Program Rules, PROPUBLICA (Aug. 16, 2010, 8:02 AM), https://www.propublica.org/ 
article/homeowner-questionnaire-shows-banks-violating-govt-program-rules [https://perma.cc/ 
VNZ7-P473] (finding that applicants had to resubmit the same documents six times before they 
received the servicing solution to which they were entitled). 
 111.  See Henry E. Smith, Modularity in Contracts: Boilerplate and Information Flow, 104 
MICH. L. REV. 1175, 1176 (2006) (defining modularity as “a device to deal with complexity by 
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under one term of the contract impacts the operation of other terms of 
the contract. In data terms, changes on any one field of the SOR or 
other database may require changes across several fields.  
Late fees illustrate this point: If a borrower who makes regular 
monthly payments makes a payment late and incurs a late fee, firms 
may not process any of the payment until the borrower also pays the 
late fee. If the borrower does not realize she has incurred a late fee, she 
will not pay it and will instead make a regular payment next month. A 
portion of this second payment will cover the late fee owed on the first 
payment, but then the second payment will be short. The firm would 
then hold the remainder of the second payment in suspense. Although 
the consumer continues to make payments, the account would remain 
delinquent,112 potentially impacting the consumer’s credit score. This 
solution is nominally easy, but in a world of automated payments, 
consumers may not notice the issue for quite some time. For consumers 
then, the cost of not reading statements or obsessively checking online 
accounts can be quite high. Automation poses risks for consumers and 
firms alike.  
Terms sometimes become more complex once an account enters 
collections because the collections agency may, rightly or wrongly, 
impose additional fees or payment rules on the borrower. Depending 
on how the debt collector charges interest and fees, the amount that a 
customer “owes” may change with each transfer, notwithstanding any 
action by the consumer.113 Although any new rules should be 
communicated to consumers by mail,114 it may be difficult for 
consumers to track these changes.115 And even if consumers can figure 
out what they owe to whom, the delay between when any change on 
their account goes into effect and when a consumer becomes aware of 
 
decomposing a complex system into pieces (modules), in which communications (or other 
interdependencies) are intense within the module but sparse and standardized across modules”). 
 112.  See John Rao, What Every Homeowner Should Know About Mortgage Payments: 
Consumer Debt Advice from NCLC, NCLC DIGIT. LIBR. (July 9, 2018), https://library.nclc.org/ 
what-every-homeowner-should-know-about-mortgage-payments-consumer-debt-advice-nclc 
[https://perma.cc/458G-9RRM] (explaining what happens to delinquent accounts). 
 113.  Jiménez, supra note 86, at 54. 
 114.  Reaching consumers is itself a complex task since their addresses and phone numbers 
may change without the change being reflected in any SOR. Firms have little incentive to maintain 
accurate customer data on charged-off accounts because they often disclaim any warranty for the 
accuracy of their data when they sell the accounts. Id. at 62. 
 115.  See id. at 54 (explaining that “a consumer may receive dunning letters requesting 
different amounts from different debt buyers about the same debt”); see also id. at 84 
(“Consumers can find it difficult to identify the right person to pay.”).  
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it may cause consumers to make payments to the wrong firm or in an 
unacceptable format. The potential complexity here lies both in 
whether or how any mistaken payment should be rerouted and in 
whether or how such a payment should impact customers’ accounts at 
the correct payee. 
6. Opacity. Most consumers are dependent on firms’ systems to 
know their own obligations under their contracts. There are both 
substantive and structural reasons why any term may be opaque. 
Substantively, some terms are complicated. They may require inputs 
from several fluctuating sources or require multiple steps to calculate. 
The math might not be difficult, but there may be a lot of steps 
involved. 
The structural barriers to understanding terms are twofold. First, 
as Professor Lauren Willis explains, most consumers cannot 
independently validate their mortgage company’s payment 
calculations—their mortgage contracts are too complex relative to 
their financial literacy.116 That is, they may understand the payment 
amount and when it is due, but cannot explain how the firm calculated 
that number with sufficient specificity to check the firm’s math. 
Consumer financial contracts tend to be facially simple but internally 
complex. So a consumer evaluating a credit card contract might receive 
and even understand a disclosed annual percentage rate (“APR”),117 
but struggle to calculate that APR based on their own records.  
Second, many consumer financial contracts leave some price terms 
to the discretion of the firm. For example, a provision that allows a 
mortgagee to mow the lawn if the borrower fails to do so may allow the 
mortgagee to pass the costs on to consumers.118  
 
 116.  See Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 IOWA L. REV. 197, 219–
26 (2008) (explaining that even intensive financial education rarely helps consumers understand 
the core terms of their loans). 
 117.  That said, there is considerable evidence that consumers struggle to understand 
regulated disclosures of financial terms. See James M. Lacko & Janis K. Pappalardo, The Failure 
and Promise of Mandated Consumer Mortgage Disclosures: Evidence from Qualitative Interviews 
and a Controlled Experiment with Mortgage Borrowers, 100 AM. ECON. REV. 516, 518–19 (2010) 
(finding that though consumers rarely understood the Truth in Lending Act disclosures required 
before 2010, they better understand simplified disclosures). 
 118.  See Making Payments to Your Mortgage Servicer, FED. TRADE COMM’N: CONSUMER 
INFO. (June 2010), https://www.consumer.ftc.gov/articles/0190-making-payments-your-mortgage-
servicer [https://perma.cc/BAD3-RYGT] (“If the property is not being properly maintained, the 
servicer may order ‘property preservation services,’ like lawn mowing, landscaping and repairing 
or boarding up broken windows and doors. The costs for these services, which can add up to 
hundreds or thousands of dollars, are charged to your loan account.”); see also Adam J. Levitin 
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In the financial sector, regulations attempt to provide consumers 
with the details they need to understand the status of their accounts,119 
but there is little evidence this information is meaningful to the average 
consumer.120 Moreover, as explained above, contracts between 
consumers and financial firms are only a small portion of consumer 
financial contracts. Regulators from other industries impose few such 
requirements. 
Unable to validate their own data, consumers have little choice 
but to rely on their servicers’ calculations as they appear on monthly 
statements, notices, or an online account portal. Mailed statements and 
notices can only present a snapshot of an account that may no longer 
be operative by the time the consumer digests the mailing. Online 
portals can theoretically present a more real-time picture of a 
customer’s account, but they are subject to the same limits as the 
SOR—they can only ever be as accurate as the data they receive.121 
If consumers have questions, their only recourse is to ask customer 
service agents.122 These customer service agents have the benefit of the 
SOR when answering questions, but are unlikely to be experts in the 
terms and regulations that animate the data therein. Given the 
limitations of their own financial literacy and that of the limitations of 
their contacts at firms, consumers have virtually no pathway to discover 
their real-time account balance and the logic for that balance. They 
may call the debt holder to discover what the SOR says at any one 
minute, but they have no guarantee the total will not change between 
when they call and when they make their payments. 
Moreover, as described above, the SOR may be the official record 
of customers’ accounts, but it is not the only record. The presence of 
 
& Tara Twomey, Mortgage Servicing, 28 YALE J. ON REG. 1, 42–43 (2011) (explaining that 
servicers have broad power to preserve encumbered property at the expense of borrowers). 
 119.  For example, Regulation Z details how firms need to present data about their residential 
mortgages to borrowers. 12 C.F.R. § 1026.41 (2021). 
 120.  See Alycia Chin & Wändi Bruine de Bruin, Helping Consumers To Evaluate Annual 
Percentage Rates (APR) on Credit Cards, 25 J. EXPERIMENTAL PSYCH. 77, 77–78 (2019) (showing 
that absolute recall of APR following disclosure does not translate into better consumer decision-
making). 
 121.  See supra Part I.B.4 (describing limitations related to data accuracy). 
 122.  When firms misbill consumers, consumers cannot correct the error by paying the correct 
amount instead of the billed amount. Many firms will not apply payments that are less than the 
billed amount, so the customer will face the same consequences that they would have faced had 
they made no payment at all. See Gretchen Morgenson, Can These Mortgages Be Saved?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Sept. 30, 2007), https://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/30/business/30country.html?smid 
[https://perma.cc/8C68-2L3C] (reporting some of the most harrowing examples from early in the 
Foreclosure Crisis). 
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additional systems that may reconcile into the SOR in the future 
contributes to the opacity of the system. Even a diligent consumer who 
reads their statements and calls customer service to verify their account 
information at Time 1 may still be surprised at Time 2.  
C. Regular Complexities 
This Section describes three additional features of consumer 
financial contracts. These appear in only a subset of contracts, but they 
are not rare. Where they appear, they help explain how firms’ 
obligations to their consumers have become so troublesome.  
1. Third-Party Servicers.  Another wrinkle in consumer financial 
contracts is the firm that contracts with the customer may assign the 
contract to a third party or sell the right to service the contract. This 
means the firm that performs much of the contract is often not the firm 
with which the consumer contracted.  
Adding another firm to the relationship adds another layer of 
complexity. The firm that ultimately services a consumer contract, the 
servicer, must rely on data from the firm that originally contracted with 
the consumer. Evidence from the years following the Great Recession 
suggests that this data transfer is often where firm-side performance 
breaks down.123 Recall a firm’s SOR is but one of the official systems 
that might have data about a customer’s account. If a servicer sets up 
its system relying on its predecessor’s SOR, it may fail to capture the 
full agreement between the contracting firm and the consumer.124 
2. Debt Collectors.  When consumers fail to satisfy their 
contractual obligations, the focus of servicing shifts from payment 
processing to payment collection.125 If a firm has not already sold the 
 
 123.  E.g., Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB Sues Ocwen for Failing 
Borrowers Throughout Mortgage Servicing Process (Apr. 20, 2017), https:// 
www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-sues-ocwen-failing-borrowers-throughout-
mortgage-servicing-process [https://perma.cc/LVL9-FGNK] (“Ocwen . . . sold off the servicing 
rights to loans without fully disclosing the mistakes it made in borrowers’ records.”). 
 124.  E.g., Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, CFPB and Federal Trade Commission 
Take Action Against Green Tree Servicing for Mistreating Borrowers Trying To Save Their 
Homes (Apr. 21, 2015), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/cfpb-and-federal-
trade-commission-take-action-against-green-tree-servicing-for-mistreating-borrowers-trying-to-
save-their-homes [https://perma.cc/4HWD-XS6X] (explaining that Green Tree continued to 
attempt to collect payments from borrowers based on the original loan agreement even where the 
borrower had reached a modified agreement with the prior servicer). 
 125.  See generally Jiménez, supra note 86 (explaining how debt collection works). 
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contract to a second company, it often writes it off and sells it to a 
specialized collections firm.126 Unlike predefault or regular servicing, 
there is no relationship between customer and firm to be maintained: 
the customer has long since breached their obligations. The reputation 
of these specialized collections firms is low for good reason.127 
Collections, like predefault servicing, is a mostly automated 
process with pockets of significant human labor.128 When a collections 
firm purchases accounts, it is purchasing contracts that have been 
mostly reduced to spreadsheets. Its ability to collect depends in part on 
the integrity of the data encoded on the spreadsheets.129 Some of these 
firms have the bargaining power to negotiate for data-quality metrics 
in their contracts with the original creditors. But because it is a highly 
competitive industry populated by small firms, many other firms do 
not. Indeed, many firms selling charged-off accounts to debt collectors 
specifically disclaim any liability for the accuracy of the data.130  
Consumers’ experience in collections depends in part on the 
integrity of the data encoded on the spreadsheets. In theory, federal 
law polices the integrity of this data131 or at least gives consumers the 
right to contest collections efforts.132 In practice, many consumers fail 
to contest collections efforts, regardless of the merits of those efforts.133 
Even for consumers who might contest the collections effort, it is easy 
to see how the burden of bringing suit under the Fair Debt Collection 
Practices Act (“FDCPA”) for violations of collections law might not 
 
 126.  The Congressional Research Service reported that “[a]s of 2020, there were nearly 7,000 
collection agencies in the United States, and the industry’s annual revenue was about $13.4 
billion.” CHERYL R. COOPER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R46477, THE DEBT COLLECTION MARKET 
AND SELECTED POLICY ISSUES 1 (2021), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R46477.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/ZWK9-8DAB]. The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”) found “about 
one-third of consumers with a credit bureau file reported being contacted in the last year by at 
least one creditor or collector.” Id. at 5. 
 127.  See Jake Halpern, Inside the Dark, Lucrative World of Consumer Debt Collection, N.Y. 
TIMES (Aug. 14, 2014), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/08/15/magazine/bad-paper-
debt-collector.html [https://perma.cc/2J4Y-UVYS]. 
 128.  Andrew Martin, Automated Debt-Collection Lawsuits Engulf Courts, N.Y. TIMES (July 
12, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/07/13/business/13collection.html [https://perma.cc/ 
CS83-BVHZ]. 
 129.  See Halpern, supra note 127. 
 130.  Jiménez, supra note 86, at 61–63. 
 131.  The exact rules policing data integrity depend in part on which entities police the 
underlying creditor. 
 132.  See Fair Debt Collection Practices Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b). 
 133.  See Martin, supra note 128. 
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be worth the effort. Given that many debt collectors are small firms,134 
it is unclear whether they would have sufficient assets to make lawsuits 
against them worth the time and expense. 
Consumers’ ability to satisfy the debt depends in part on their 
abilities to discover the amount owed from the collections servicer. 
Because collections firms often add their fees to the customers’ bills, 
whether permissible or not, consumers can no longer rely on data from 
the original creditor about what they owe.135 Unless and until the 
borrower discovers that sum and satisfies it before it changes again, the 
collections servicer will continue calling, mailing, and otherwise 
coaxing the consumer to make payments on the debt.  
If and when consumers fail to satisfy the debt and fees owed to the 
collections servicer, that firm can sue the borrower—usually in small 
claims court—to reduce the outstanding bill to a judgment. It then has 
various options for enforcing the judgment, but garnishment orders are 
common.136 Under a garnishment order, creditors receive a portion of 
a consumer’s paycheck and government benefits directly. Since many 
consumers do not respond to the lawsuits requesting these orders—and 
when they do, they rarely have the wherewithal to properly defend 
themselves—collections firms are often able to get judgments for sums 
greater than what the consumer owes under their contract.137 
3. Consumer Bankruptcy.  Consumer bankruptcy adds another 
wrinkle to consumer financial contracts. It is effectively another layer 
of regulation that requires a firm, no matter how it may structure its 
contracts with consumers, to be able to modify its servicing systems to 
accommodate however a bankruptcy court intends to handle that 
 
 134.  Cooper, supra note 126, at 3 (estimating that 95% of all debt collectors are small 
businesses). 
 135.  See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES ACT: CFPB 
ANNUAL REPORT 2013, at 18 (2013), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201303_cfpb_March_ 
FDCPA_Report1.pdf [https://perma.cc/UP37-LDPJ]. The CFPB received thousands of 
complaints about collections agencies charging unauthorized fees each year. Id. at 17–18.  
 136.  ADP, the largest payroll services firm, found that “more than one in 10 employees in 
the prime working ages of 35 to 44 had their wages garnished.” Paul Kiel, Unseen Toll: Wages of 
Millions Seized To Pay Past Debts, PROPUBLICA (Sept. 15, 2014, 5:00 AM), https:// 
www.propublica.org/article/unseen-toll-wages-of-millions-seized-to-pay-past-debts [https:// 
perma.cc/M6TZ-BU84]. 
 137.  See generally Erika Rickard, How Debt Collectors Are Transforming the Business of 
State Courts, PEW (May 6, 2020), https://www.pewtrusts.org/en/research-and-analysis/reports/ 
2020/05/how-debt-collectors-are-transforming-the-business-of-state-courts [https://perma.cc/ 
V8GV-DB4E] (explaining the current state of collection actions in courts). 
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contract.138 If the firm fails to do so, it risks violating provisions of the 
U.S. Bankruptcy Code as well as other consumer protection 
regulations.139 
For example, imagine a consumer who owes their water company 
$300 in back payments, representing three months of unpaid bills. 
Under normal circumstances, three months of arrears might cause the 
water company to charge off the consumer’s arrears, sell the account 
to a debt collector, or even shut off the consumer’s water. If the 
consumer files for bankruptcy before the water company takes these 
steps, the automatic stay prevents the water company from proceeding. 
That is, even though the consumer still owes the water company for 
three months of service, the water company cannot take any additional 
steps to collect the debt. Instead, it must file a claim and wait. To make 
this work, the water company must have the technological capacity to 
adjust its systems to accommodate accounts in bankruptcy, an 
extremely heterogeneous category. Then, if the consumer successfully 
completes the bankruptcy process,140 the company will need to adjust 
its servicing technology to respect the discharge injunction, which bars 
it from collecting any arrears that were discharged in the bankruptcy 
proceeding. The complexity of the consumer bankruptcy system all but 
invites servicing errors. 
*    *   * 
In sum, complex servicing processes support even the most basic 
consumer financial contracts. These processes regularly become still 
more complex if the consumer defaults on their obligations. This 
complexity creates ample opportunity for firms to default on their 
obligations as well. At the very least, many failures to properly service 
these contracts are also failures to comply with the state and federal 
regulations that govern servicing. Although the specific rules 
governing servicing vary, the gist is there are mandatory rules that 
govern servicing. The question then is why servicing errors persist. 
 
 138.  See generally D’Onfro, supra note 15 (explaining the risks of rigid servicing systems). 
 139.  See, e.g., CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, SUPERVISORY HIGHLIGHTS: ISSUE 12, 
SUMMER 2016 6–8 (2016) (finding violations of the FDCPA through violations of consumer 
bankruptcy provisions).  
 140.  The consumer’s specific obligations will vary depending on both the chapter of the 
Bankruptcy Code under which the consumer seeks relief and the local rules governing consumer 
bankruptcy in the court in which the consumer files for protection. 
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II. THE PERSISTENCE OF POOR SERVICING 
This Part tells the second half of the story of how consumer 
financial contracts became a system of unilateral obligations. Where 
the first half was about how features of the contracts complicate 
servicing, this half is about how external factors further encourage poor 
servicing. In short, bad servicing begets bad servicing because bad 
servicing creates bad data. And bad data also complicates efforts to 
enforce consumer financial contracts in both private litigation and 
regulatory proceedings. 
A. Market Incentives 
If a firm is bad at servicing, why do customers continue doing 
business with that firm? There are at least five features of servicing that 
shield the firm from market-based correction. First, consumers often 
have no choice over which company services their contract because the 
party with whom they contract may sell the servicing rights to a third 
party.141 Consumer financial contracts rarely give consumers any say 
when they transfer servicing rights. Thus, even if a consumer has strong 
preferences for not doing business with a particular party, they may 
have few options for avoiding that party if they need debt. Because 
consumers rarely choose their servicer, servicers market their skills to 
underwriters or the sponsors of securitizations, not to consumers, and 
the cost metrics that underwriters value are not necessarily the care 
metrics that consumers value.142 Theoretically, poor servicing could 
impact the reputation of the originator if it was known to not vet the 
parties to whom it sold servicing rights,143 but there is little evidence of 
this occurring. 
Second, even when they have a choice about who services their 
financial contract, consumers may not know a firm is bad at servicing. 
Simply put, information about any firm’s performance as a servicer 
may not make it into resources consumers consult before choosing 
their business partners. If a firm is persistently making small servicing 
 
 141.  See supra Part I.C (explaining the complexities of servicing). 
 142.  See Jack M. Guttentag, Why Is Mortgage Servicing So Bad?, MORTG. PROFESSOR, 
https://www.mtgprofessor.com/A%20-%20Servicing/why_is_servicing_so_bad.htm [https:// 
perma.cc/PP7U-QAXU] (last updated Dec. 13, 2004) (arguing that servicing would be better if 
consumers could fire their servicers). 
 143.  See OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC BULLETIN 2014–37, 
CONSUMER DEBT SALES: RISK MANAGEMENT GUIDANCE 2–3 (2014) (detailing risks of selling 
debt to debt buyers). 
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errors but does not attract regulatory action or a well-publicized 
lawsuit, consumers are unlikely to know about the firm’s servicing 
track record. Alternatively, a firm might generate significant news 
about its servicing failures, but the firm’s target customers may not 
read the kinds of news sources that report on regulatory actions and 
lawsuits.  
Firms might also take steps to prevent disgruntled consumers from 
publicly complaining, which in turn tends to deprive the market of 
information about the quality of firms’ services. Firms have two 
touchpoints at which they can limit consumers’ rights to broadcast 
derogatory information about the firm. Firms attempted to put 
nondisparagement clauses, also known as gag clauses, in their contracts 
before state and federal law outlawed doing so.144 Of course, even if 
these clauses are unenforceable, they may still influence consumer 
behavior if consumers feel bound by them.145 If a consumer does sue 
the firm over a servicing error, the firm may prefer to settle the lawsuit 
in exchange for a nondisclosure agreement. The nondisclosure 
agreement protects the firm from reputational damage, denying 
consumers information that might influence their shopping patterns.146 
Third, even if consumers could negotiate for better servicing, it is 
not obvious they would. Servicing is supposed to be invisible. Bad 
servicing implies one party is likely either in breach of the contract or 
engaged in unexpected opportunism. Presumably, consumers would 
not contract with parties whom they expected to breach the contract 
when they themselves do not prefer the contract be breached. But 
consumers cannot weigh every possible variable and outcome when 
 
 144.  See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 1670.8 (West 2021); 15 U.S.C. § 45b(b) (voiding some 
contracts that limit consumer reviews). 
 145.  See Meirav Furth-Matzkin & Roseanna Sommers, Consumer Psychology and the 
Problem of Fine Print Fraud, 72 STAN. L. REV. 503, 504 (2020); J.J. Prescott & Evan 
Starr, Subjective Beliefs about Contract Enforceability 1–2 (Oct. 6, 2021) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3873638 [https://perma.cc/ 
GLW4-E7QX]. 
 146.  See Christopher R. Drahozal & Laura J. Hines, Secret Settlement Restrictions and 
Unintended Consequences, 54 U. KAN. L. REV. 1457, 1458 (2006) (“Critics argue that secret 
settlements permit harmful practices—e.g., exploding tires and child molestation—to continue 
for longer than they would have continued were public access to information not restricted by the 
settlement agreement.”); see also Rhonda Wasserman, Secret Class Action Settlements, 31 REV. 
LITIG. 889, 914 (2012) (arguing secret settlements also undermine the legitimacy of the legal 
system by preventing citizens from seeing courts in action). 
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choosing their contracts.147 Instead, they make choices based on terms 
more salient to them, like price. Such constrained decision-making is 
not irrational as long as the terms on which consumers do choose their 
contracts—when they have a choice—are terms that maximize the 
chance the contract will comport with their expectations.  
As long as servicing quality has little impact on consumers’ 
decisions about whether to enter into a contract, firms have little 
incentive to invest in servicing. Consumers and firms often have 
different priorities during contract performance. If the parties have 
made a commitment on price, rational consumers want the remainder 
of the relationship to comport with their preferences, particularly 
around quality and speed. The consumer need not care about cost of 
performance to the other party. But of course, the firm’s business 
depends on cost of performance. Therefore, the firm may have limited 
incentives to invest in technological innovations that improve its 
performance on contracts, especially if those improvements are of 
limited use to the marketing that induces additional consumers to enter 
into additional contracts. Firms’ incentive to innovate on servicing 
terms instead depends on whether these terms make their servicing 
more efficient and whether these terms increase the potential sale 
value of servicing rights. 
Fourth, as described, the firms drafting consumer contracts are 
often not the same firms that service the contract.148 The financial part 
of a consumer’s contract is often severable from the rest of the contract, 
meaning the contracting firm can sell servicing rights to specialized 
firms. This gives contracting firms an exit once they have completed 
the part of the contract that is their core business, leaving them with 
little incentive to draft contracts with an eye to servicing. That is, 
contracts may not interface well with servicing technology.149 This 
means the drafting firm may not bear the reputational or legal costs 
that come with contractual terms that are difficult to properly 
service.150  
 
 147.  See generally Korobkin, supra note 62 (arguing contracts have more attributes that 
consumers can weigh simultaneously, leading consumers to ignore some even when attempting to 
make rational decisions). 
 148.  See supra Part I.C. 
 149.  See infra Part II.C. 
 150.  See Kevin E. Davis, Contracts as Technology, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 83, 105 (2013) 
(“Inability to appropriate the benefits of innovation, in contracting as well as other fields, is often 
seen as one of the leading obstacles to profit-oriented innovation.”).  
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Still, one might expect market pressure from specialized servicing 
and collections firms to be an independent source of innovation in 
consumer contracts. Theoretically, they should prefer more accurate 
data from original creditors, pay a premium for it, and in turn create 
consistent market pressure favoring accuracy. But that has mostly not 
happened. To be clear, firms are drafting servicing terms to their own 
advantage,151 which benefits specialized servicers or collections firms. 
But it appears servicers lack the power or the will to change contracting 
firm behavior. 
Finally, many industries are no longer competitive, such that even 
if a consumer knows a firm stinks at servicing and the consumer prefers 
to work with a firm that is good at servicing, the consumer will 
nonetheless have to do business with the firm that stinks at servicing. 
Recent decades have brought unprecedented consolidation across 
industries.152 Although many industries appear competitive at first 
glance, that competition is often a mirage.153 Despite the existence of 
several companies providing broadband internet, many U.S. residents 
have only one, if any, broadband provider in their area.154 Just two 
credit card companies, Visa and Mastercard, dominate the market.155 
The risk of bad servicing in less competitive industries is consistent with 
the risk that the lack of competition will tend to reduce product quality 
in general. After all, what incentive does a firm have to invest in its 
product if its customers have no other option? 
B. Liability Incentives 
In theory, contractual and regulatory liability could promote 
accurate servicing even in the absence of market pressures doing the 
same. Liability is the classic tool for causing firms to internalize costs 
 
 151.  See Korobkin, supra note 62, at 1207 (explaining that consumers’ inabilities to consider 
all of a contract’s terms at once incentivizes firms to draft nonsalient terms in their interest). 
 152.  See generally BARRY C. LYNN, CORNERED: THE NEW MONOPOLY CAPITALISM AND 
THE ECONOMICS OF DESTRUCTION (2011) (cataloging consolidation across the U.S. economy). 
 153.  Id. 
 154.  See Emily Stewart, America’s Monopoly Problem, Explained by Your Internet Bill, VOX 
(Feb. 18, 2020, 7:00 AM), https://www.vox.com/the-goods/2020/2/18/21126347/antitrust-
monopolies-internet-telecommunications-cheerleading [https://perma.cc/86NQ-H72A]. 
 155.  While American Express and Discover do provide some additional competition, most 
consumers cannot rely solely on these brands because not enough points of sale accept them, and 
it is often not apparent which ones do before the consumer begins shopping. See Andrew Martin, 
How Visa, Using Card Fees, Dominates a Market, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 4, 2010), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2010/01/05/your-money/credit-and-debit-cards/05visa.html [https://perma.cc/ 
DMG7-SG5E]. 
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that they are otherwise able to externalize onto other stakeholders.156 
With properly calibrated liability, the costs of not making these 
investments would exceed the cost of making them. Under the current 
system, consumers and the broader social safety net bear many of the 
costs of inaccurate servicing because the legal system has few effective 
tools for making firms liable for inaccurate servicing.  
This Section briefly surveys the available tools for holding firms 
legally accountable for inaccurate servicing. It begins with the 
regulatory framework that aims to protect consumers from servicing 
mistakes. There it finds a system rich in rules but missing meaningful 
enforcement from regulators. It then turns to private litigation and 
finds even where clearly applicable causes of action offer remedies for 
inaccurate servicing, consumers face nearly insurmountable barriers to 
receiving remedies under these causes of action. It concludes with a few 
observations about the system of liability for inaccurate servicing.  
1. Public Regulation and Enforcement.  At first glance, the 
problems of servicing appear to be regulatory problems.157 Clear rules, 
protective standards, and robust enforcement would theoretically 
protect consumers.158 Regulation has surely enhanced servicing in the 
areas that it touches, but there is still ample room for improvement. 
Yet, there are several reasons to be skeptical that regulatory 
innovations are going to create lasting improvements in servicing. 
Federal regulation of servicing has historically been thin,159 but 
that is changing.160 The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
 
 156.  Richard A. Posner, Some Uses and Abuses of Economics in Law, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 
281, 305 (1979) (“Property rights and liability rules . . . are devices by which people are given 
incentives to internalize the costs and benefits of their actions so that an efficient allocation of 
resources is achieved.”). 
 157.  See generally Prentiss Cox, Public Enforcement Compensation and Private Rights, 100 
MINN. L. REV. 2313 (2016) (defining consumer protection as a core area of public enforcement 
notwithstanding contracts between firms and consumers that might give rise to claims in private 
law). 
 158.  See generally MICHAEL S. BARR, SENDHIL MULLAINATHAN & ELDAR SHAFIR, 
BEHAVIORALLY INFORMED FINANCIAL SERVICES REGULATION (2008) (discussing financial 
service policy approaches to protect consumers).  
 159.  States are ill-equipped to regulate servicing because firms can shop among the states for 
favorable rules and then export those rules to every state in which they do business. See, e.g., 
Smiley v. Citibank, 517 U.S. 735, 744 (1996) (holding the interest that a national bank may charge 
on debt is governed by the state in which the bank is chartered and not subject to the rules of 
states in which borrowers reside). 
 160.  The CFPB has issued several new servicing rules for mortgages, but it shifted course 
after the election of former President Donald Trump and scaled back its plans to regulate 
servicing in other sectors. Kate Berry, From Overdraft to HMDA, Rulemaking Has New Look at 
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(“CFPB”) has the authority to regulate “extending credit and servicing 
loans,”161 and it has promulgated detailed rules for servicing certain 
kinds of debt, especially mortgages.162 These rules tend to focus on the 
processes that comprise servicing and leave price terms within the 
discretion of the market.163  
Meticulously regulating each step of the servicing process is an 
appealing response to some of the servicing failures of the last decade. 
With enforcement, these regulations may produce more accurate 
servicing. But regulating each step of the servicing process may not be 
the most efficient path to protecting consumers. Indeed, it might not 
lead there at all. Customer harm occurs when firm behavior does not 
match consumer expectations. For an individual on a budget, what 
matters is the total on the bill. The math of how to get to that amount 
seems less important than the payment amount itself. Therein lies the 
tension: our system rightly hesitates to regulate price terms, but 
consumers need predictable prices. Moreover, consumer protection 
depends on enforcement. The following subsection explains the 
barriers consumers face in privately enforcing their bargains.164 For 
now, suffice it to say the structural barriers are great enough that public 
enforcement remains an essential component to consumer protection 
for the foreseeable future. 
Public enforcement’s track record is abysmal. For example, in 
January 2019, the CFPB reached a $3.2 million settlement with Enova, 
an online payday lender,165 for various violations of the Consumer 
Financial Protection Act of 2010.166 In addition to charging the civil 
 
Mulvaney’s CFPB, AM. BANKER (May 16, 2018, 4:56 PM), https:// 
www.americanbanker.com/list/from-overdraft-to-hmda-rulemaking-has-new-look-at-mick-
mulvaneys-cfpb [https://perma.cc/QXY6-FVSD]. 
 161.  12 U.S.C. § 5481(15)(A)(i). 
 162.  See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 1026 (2021) (prohibiting a creditor from offering higher-priced 
mortgages to consumers without considering their abilities to repay the debt—also known as 
Regulation Z or the “Ability-to-Repay” standard). 
 163.  See Nakita Q. Cuttino, The Rise of “FringeTech”: Regulatory Risks in Earned-Wage 
Access, 115 NW. U. L. REV. 1505, 1532 (2021) (“Federal law rarely places limitations on the 
specific terms of credit services, such as pricing, principal amounts, or collection terms.”). 
 164.  See infra Part II.B.2. 
 165.  Enova describes itself as “a leading provider of online financial services to non-prime 
consumers and small businesses, providing access to credit powered by its advanced analytics, 
innovative technology, and world-class online platform and services.” Press Release, Enova, 
Enova Reaches Agreement with CFPB for Consumer Loan Payment Processing Errors (Jan. 25, 
2019), http://ir.enova.com/2019-01-25-Enova-Reaches-Agreement-with-CFPB-for-Consumer-
Loan-Payment-Processing-Errors [https://perma.cc/5HUU-ZPBQ]. 
 166.  Id. 
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money penalty, the CFPB stated Enova was “permanently restrained 
and enjoined from” both debiting customer accounts without prior 
authorization and “[f]ailing to honor loan extensions granted to 
consumers.”167 This settlement is typical of settlements offered by the 
CFPB.168 
The $3.2 million civil money penalty is probably peanuts. At the 
time of the settlement, Enova boasted it “provided more than 5 million 
customers around the globe with access to more than $20 billion in 
loans and financing.”169 The penalty is only effective if it is large 
enough, when combined with the other provisions of the settlement, to 
incentivize Enova to make the technology investments needed not only 
to ensure it does not commit this particular wrong again, but also to 
ensure it improves its servicing generally. Given the cost of these kinds 
of technology investments, it is not obvious a fine of this size will create 
the necessary incentives, even with the injunction against future 
violations of the law. After all, that injunction only matters to the 
extent it turns into future penalties. If penalties are reliably small, the 
injunction against future wrongdoing is also meaningless. 
Similarly, in its largest enforcement action to date in 2016, the 
CFPB fined Wells Fargo $100 million for the “widespread illegal 
practice of secretly opening unauthorized deposit and credit card 
accounts.”170 Wells Fargo had created an incentive structure for its 
associates that rewarded new accounts at all costs.171 Thousands of 
associates then opened unauthorized and unwanted bank accounts and 
credit cards using fake email addresses that they made up for existing 
customers.172 In some cases, they moved the customers’ funds into 
these phony accounts, causing overdrafts and other losses to the 
customers.173 In other words, Wells Fargo associates were pervasively 
stealing customers’ identities to goose their own sales. Wells Fargo, for 
 
 167.  Enova International, LLC, CFPB No. 2019-BCFP-0003 (Jan. 25, 2019). 
 168.  See generally Christopher L. Peterson, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau Law 
Enforcement: An Empirical Review, 90 TUL. L. REV. 1057 (2016) (describing the first four years 
of the CFPB’s enforcement activities). 
 169.  Press Release, Enova, supra note 165. 
 170.  Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
Fines Wells Fargo $100 Million for Widespread Illegal Practice of Secretly Opening Unauthorized 
Accounts (Sept. 8, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-
financial-protection-bureau-fines-wells-fargo-100-million-widespread-illegal-practice-secretly-
opening-unauthorized-accounts [https://perma.cc/CG88-62MV].  
 171.  Id. 
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. 
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its part, failed to account for the incentives its rules were creating or to 
monitor its associates even in the face of mounting evidence of 
wrongdoing. All of this is very bad, and if ever there was a case for a 
big penalty, this was it. But $100 million is not a big penalty for a 
company the size of Wells Fargo. Indeed, it was not enough to cause 
Wells Fargo to get these practices under control. Just two years later, 
in April 2018, the CFPB fined Wells Fargo $1 billion for similar 
practices in its auto and mortgage businesses.174 That fine was less than 
25 percent of its earnings in the first quarter of 2018.175 Consumer 
advocates immediately questioned whether the billion-dollar fine 
would deter wrongdoing.176 
Stepping back even further, it is not clear that one-off 
enforcement, which even the former director of the CFPB compared 
to “that old game at the carnival, ‘Whack a Mole,’”177 would incentivize 
industry change. Yet whack-a-mole enforcement is what the CFPB has 
historically done and what it continues to do. Even after the Wells 
Fargo scandal, no one expected the CFPB to perform an industry-wide 
investigation into similar practices at other institutions.178 Across the 
federal government, appetite for hard-charging regulatory 
enforcement actions has withered.179  
There is no reason to think regulators are soon to take a more 
systemic approach to enforcing consumer protection laws. The 
regulatory landscape is too fragmented for any one regulator to 
 
 174.  Emily Stewart, Wells Fargo Just Got Fined $1 Billion. Republicans Cut Its Taxes by $3.7 
Billion, VOX (Apr. 21, 2018, 11:21 AM), https://www.vox.com/policy-and-politics/2018/4/21/ 
17265796/wells-fargo-fine-cfpb-tax-cut [https://perma.cc/94X9-CU3P]. 
 175.  Id.  
 176.  Will a $1 Billion Fine Change Wells Fargo?, KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON (Apr. 26, 2018), 
https://knowledge.wharton.upenn.edu/article/the-wells-fargo-fine [https://perma.cc/68LP-RQJ7]. 
 177.  Richard Cordray, Dir., Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Prepared Remarks Before the 
National Association of Attorneys General (Mar. 6, 2012), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/ 
about-us/newsroom/prepared-remarks-by-richard-cordray-before-the-national-association-of-
attorneys-general [https://perma.cc/8JXN-G7BL].  
 178.  KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON, supra note 176. 
 179.  See generally BRANDON GARRETT, TOO BIG TO JAIL: HOW PROSECUTORS 
COMPROMISE WITH CORPORATIONS (2014) (explaining how the importance of the nation’s 
largest companies in the economy tends to put them above the law); JESSE EISINGER, THE 
CHICKENSHIT CLUB: WHY THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT FAILS TO PROSECUTE EXECUTIVES 
(2017) (describing federal prosecutors as being afraid of going to trial against large corporations 
after the fallout from the Arthur Andersen prosecution in the early aughts). 
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oversee servicing across industries.180 Even where they have 
jurisdiction, the federal consumer protection regulators are continually 
weakened by some combination of pettiness,181 careerism,182 industry 
capture,183 and old-fashioned politics.184 Thus, despite having powerful 
tools like unfair, deceptive and abusive acts and practices 
(“UDAAP”),185 regulators are unlikely to focus their limited resources 
on the greatest harms. Although poor servicing may lend itself to 
regulatory solutions, history suggests regulators will be mercurial 
partners at best.186  
Weak regulatory oversight of consumer financial contracts may 
compound the market failures described above. Enforcement actions 
produce the kind of data about a firm’s trustworthiness that consumers 
need to make informed choices.187  
 
 180.  The one exception is debt in collections because these debts may come from any 
obligation, but regulators like the CFPB have jurisdiction to regulate some practices of debt 
collectors. See Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (Regulation F), 12 C.F.R. pt. 1006 (2021).  
 181.  Hal Singer, The Latest Facebook Scandal Is Also a Crisis for the FTC, SLATE (Dec. 19, 
2018, 4:42 PM), https://slate.com/technology/2018/12/facebook-privacy-scandal-ftc-crisis.html 
[https://perma.cc/H8LY-JZBF] (exploring the Federal Trade Commission’s (“FTC”) focus on 
alleged cartels among music teachers and ice skating instructors while ignoring similar problems 
in the much larger tech industry). The misplaced priorities of the CFPB were most on display in 
its fight over the terms of how it appoints its director, in particular the 2017 fight over whether 
Richard Cordray could appoint Leandra English as acting director upon his resignation. Tara 
Siegel Bernard, Dueling Appointments Lead to Clash at Consumer Protection Bureau, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 24, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/24/us/politics/consumer-financial-protection-
bureau-cordray-leader-trump-mulvaney.html [https://perma.cc/5JJM-ZTXG]. 
 182.  See EISINGER, supra note 179, at xiv (describing many prosecutors as more concerned 
with maintaining their win records than with zealously enforcing the law).  
 183.  See Michael D. Donovan, Has the Debt Collection Industry Captured the CFPB?, A.B.A. 
LITIG. SECTION  (Sept. 27, 2019), https://www.americanbar.org/groups/litigation/committees/ 
class-actions/articles/2019/summer2019-debt-collection-industry-captured-cfpb [https://perma.cc/ 
5QSE-P798]. 
 184.  Catherine Rampell, Opinion, Why Do Republicans Hate Consumers?, WASH. POST 
(July 16, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/why-do-republicans-hate-
consumers/2018/07/16/0398840c-8933-11e8-85ae-511bc1146b0b_story.html [https://perma.cc/3ARA-
BXX3]. 
 185.  UDAAP refers to a more comprehensive formulation of unfair and deceptive acts and 
practices (“UDAP”), which has been a longstanding framework for consumer protection laws at 
both the state and federal levels. See OFF. OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, UNFAIR 
OR DECEPTIVE ACTS OR PRACTICES AND UNFAIR, DECEPTIVE, OR ABUSIVE ACTS OR 
PRACTICES 1 (2020), https://www.occ.gov/publications-and-resources/publications/comptrollers-
handbook/files/unfair-deceptive-act/pub-ch-udap-udaap.pdf [https://perma.cc/6PNV-FHD7]. 
 186.  Even where the federal consumer protection regulators do intervene, they seem to lack 
a plan. See Singer, supra note 181 (criticizing the FTC’s lack of strategy in enforcement actions). 
 187.  Making this kind of information available to consumers was one of the justifications for 
the CFPB’s consumer complaints database. The idea of a public complaints database as an adjunct 
for enforcement action belongs to Senator Elizabeth Warren’s early conceptions for the CFPB. 
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In sum, regulators lack the jurisdiction, vision, and institutional 
capacity to systemically improve servicing.188 They can require certain 
kinds of companies take certain steps or avoid certain practices in the 
hope of producing better consumer protection. But they have no way 
to future-proof these rules as consumer financial products evolve. 
2. Private Enforcement.  Without private enforcement to fill gaps 
in public enforcement, firms have little incentive to invest in servicing. 
At present, consumers who encounter inaccurate servicing have a 
menu of private causes of action to bring, but few of those options are 
likely to create the kind of liability needed to improve servicing. As 
several commentators have argued,189 consumers face nearly 
insurmountable barriers to pursuing these claims in court: arbitration 
agreements,190 limitations on class actions,191 complex procedural 
 
Ian Ayres, Jeff Lingwall & Sonia Steinway, Skeletons in the Database: An Early Analysis of the 
CFPB’s Consumer Complaints, 19 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 343, 350 (2014). Unsurprisingly, 
industry has fought efforts to make this kind of data available to consumers. See id. at 355 
(describing how the consumer finance industry fought the inclusion of firm names in the CFPB’s 
public-facing customer complaint database). It is unlikely that many consumers will be able to 
parse the complaints database, but the media and advocacy groups may be able to digest the data 
into more useful consumer guidance. See Pamela Foohey, Calling on the CFPB for Help: Telling 
Stories and Consumer Protection, 80 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 177, 185 (2017) (explaining that 
lower-income individuals are less likely to file complaints with public complaint databases). 
 188.  This problem exists even in the Department of Justice’s flagship enforcement divisions. 
See generally EISINGER, supra note 179 (tracing the rise of feckless enforcement of federal 
regulations). 
 189.  See, e.g., Amy J. Schmitz, Remedy Realities in Business-to-Consumer Contracting, 58 
ARIZ. L. REV. 213, 217–29 (2016) (explaining that remedies for consumers are mostly illusory due 
to the difficulty of prosecuting disputes with firms); see also Jean Braucher, Form and Substance 
in Consumer Financial Protection, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 107, 107–08 (2012) (arguing 
the law has historically struggled to provide adequate protection to consumers). 
 190.  See CONSUMER FIN. PROT. BUREAU, ARBITRATION STUDY: REPORT TO CONGRESS, 
PURSUANT TO DODD–FRANK WALL STREET REFORM AND CONSUMER PROTECTION ACT § 
1028(a), at 9–13 (2015) (finding arbitration clauses are pervasive in consumer contracts); Andrea 
Cann Chandrasekher & David Horton, Arbitration Nation: Data from Four Providers, 107 CALIF. 
L. REV. 1, 51 (2019) (arguing arbitration is “not currently picking up the slack left by the decline 
of the class action”); see also Judith Resnik, Diffusing Disputes: The Public in the Private of 
Arbitration, the Private in Courts, and the Erasure of Rights, 124 YALE L.J. 2804, 2804 (2015) 
(arguing developments in arbitration have eviscerated consumers’ rights); Rory Van Loo, The 
Corporation as Courthouse, 33 YALE J. ON REG. 547, 547 (2016) (arguing most consumers settle 
their disputes with firms through customer dispute programs that have even fewer protections 
than does formal arbitration).  
 191.  See Schmitz, supra note 189, at 226–30. 
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rules,192 and a lack of high-quality legal representation.193 Even when 
consumers can bring substantive claims in court, these actions amount 
to little more than “case-to-case sniping,”194 not broad incentives to 
change. Simply put, the chance that consumers receive facts-intensive, 
ex post adjudication of the contractual rights or regulatory protections 
is slim. 
When consumer financial contracts do come before courts, it is 
almost always with the consumer as a defendant in a debt collection 
proceeding. Debt collectors, firms, and, occasionally, individuals who 
purchase collection rights on consumer financial contracts use courts 
to collect money from consumers.195 These collection efforts often take 
the form of garnishment orders or other orders that gives creditors 
access to the consumer’s assets.196 Evidence suggests many consumers 
are unable to contest these claims,197 even when they might have 
meritorious claims.198 These proceedings clog court dockets and 
arguably undermine the legitimacy of the legal system.199 
 
 192.  See SARAH STASZAK, NO DAY IN COURT: ACCESS TO JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF 
JUDICIAL RETRENCHMENT 79–85 (2014). 
 193.  LEWIS CREEKMORE, RONKÉ HUGHES, LYNN JENNINGS, SARAH JOHN, JANET 
LABELLA, C. ARTURO MANJARREZ, MICHELLE OH, ZOE OSTERMAN & MARTA WOLDU, 
LEGAL SERVS. CORP., THE JUSTICE GAP: MEASURING THE UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF 
LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 9 (2017) (showing a vast “justice gap”—“the difference between the 
civil legal needs of low-income Americans and the resources available to meet those needs”).  
 194.  Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd—Consumers and the Common 
Law Tradition, 31 U. PITT. L. REV. 349, 358 (1970). But see Anne Fleming, The Rise and Fall of 
Unconscionability as the Law of the Poor, 102 GEO. L.J. 1383, 1433–35 (2014) (explaining how 
Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture made predatory installment contracts salient to legislatures 
prompting new legislation). 
 195.  See Richard M. Hynes, Broke but Not Bankrupt: Consumer Debt Collection in State 
Courts, 60 FLA. L. REV. 1, 1 (2008) (explaining that while Virginia only had roughly seven million 
residents, it has had “more than a million civil filings a year since the late 1980s. The 
overwhelming majority of these filings seek to collect debts from consumers”). 
 196.  Richard M. Hynes, Bankruptcy and State Collections: The Case of the Missing 
Garnishments, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 603, 622–25 (2006). 
 197.  See Mary Spector, Debts, Defaults and Details: Exploring the Impact of Debt Collection 
Litigation on Consumers and Courts, 6 VA. L. & BUS. REV. 257, 288 (2011) (finding that 
consumers appeared in less than a quarter of the debt collection cases in which they were served). 
 198.  See id. at 287 (arguing that the finding that 12 percent of all cases that debt collectors 
file in Dallas, Texas, are dismissed for failure to accomplish service, especially when taken with 
widespread reporting of fraudulent service in other jurisdictions, shows a burden on courts that is 
not commensurate with the merits); see also McCollough v. Johnson, Rodenburg & Lauinger, 
LLC, 637 F.3d 939, 947 (9th Cir. 2011) (explaining that one strategy law firms use to collect debts 
is to take a “‘factory’ approach” designed to “mass produc[e] default judgments” in lieu of pretrial 
investigation of the claims in the complaint). 
 199.  See infra Part IV.B. 
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C. Conflicting Innovation Timelines 
Accurate servicing depends on three innovation timelines 
remaining in sync: the contract, the regulations governing the contract, 
and the technology servicing the contract in light of the regulation. 
When these timelines fall out of sync, customer harm often follows. 
1. Contract Innovation.  If a firm wants to offer consumers a new 
contract—perhaps its A/B testing suggests a different way of 
calculating interest will be more profitable and noncontroversial 
among consumers, a competing firm is poaching customers with a new 
offer, or changing economic conditions require accommodation—the 
firm can draft a new contract. Lawyers, and perhaps other gatekeepers, 
must approve the changes. The updates might be a bureaucratic 
headache. Nevertheless, the process is technically doable by anybody 
with a word processor.200 
Professor David Hoffman and others have noted contract 
innovation occurs “seismically rather than slowly.”201 These 
commentators describe contract innovation as occurring over a 
multistep process similar to technological or product innovation.202 In 
stage one, the status quo begins to erode, but only slightly. Factors such 
as high negotiation costs, concerns about enforceability,203 and 
managers’ fear of being the one who breaks something204 encourage 
established players to resist innovation until there is a “shock[]” that 
undermines established norms.205 In stage two, more firms experiment 
with innovation in response to additional shocks that make the status 
quo increasingly untenable. In this stage, the “top market participants” 
 
 200.  But see generally Mitu Gulati & Robert E. Scott, The Three and a Half Minute 
Transaction: Boilerplate and the Limits of Contract Design, 40 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1 (2011) 
(explaining why lawyers hesitate to spend a few moments revising contracts even when their 
boilerplates are dubious). 
 201.  David A. Hoffman, Whither Bespoke Procedure?, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 389, 425; Stephen 
J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, The Dynamics of Contract Evolution, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
1, 3–4 (2013); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Innovation in Boilerplate Contracts: An 
Empirical Examination of Sovereign Bonds, 53 EMORY L.J. 929, 937–38 (2004); Clayton P. 
Gillette, Lock-In Effects in Law and Norms, 78 B.U. L. REV. 813, 819 (1998). 
 202.  See Hoffman, supra note 201; Choi, Gulati & Posner, supra note 201; Choi & Gulati, 
supra note 201; Gillette, supra note 201; Davis, supra note 150, at 85, 98; Mark C. Suchman, The 
Contract as Social Artifact, 37 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 91, 103 (2003).  
 203.  Hoffman, supra note 201; Davis, supra note 150, at 90. 
 204.  Gillette, supra note 201. 
 205.  Hoffman, supra note 201, at 425–26. 
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may attempt to differentiate themselves by innovating new terms.206 
Once promulgated, innovative terms are more likely to be widely 
adopted if official actors, such as the Supreme Court207 or industry 
groups, accept them.208 Finally, in stage three, one or some of the 
innovations gain sufficiently widespread approval that the market 
begins to prefer the innovative term as the standard over the old status 
quo.209 After a “short period of intense innovation,” the system settles 
into a steady state again.210 
Though standardized contracts require some kind of “shock” to 
create change, the realities of modern consumer litigation mean 
consumers are in a poor position to create that shock in ways likely to 
benefit their interests. Consumer contracts are not so much negotiated 
as chosen.211 Some of these contracts are barely voluntary, particularly 
in the medical and utilities contexts where there is little, if any, 
competition among firms and the consequences of foregoing a contract 
are dire.  
Today, courts adjudicating disputes arising under these contracts 
rarely see well-defended consumers challenging firms’ interpretations 
of their contracts. To the extent courts do create shocks in consumer 
financial contracts, they almost always favor firms over consumers, for 
example, by expanding the enforceability of arbitration agreements.212 
 
 206.  Choi, Gulati & Posner, supra note 201, at 29. 
 207.  Hoffman, supra note 201, at 426. 
 208.  Choi, Gulati & Posner, supra note 201, at 9. 
 209.  Arbitration clauses are among the most successful examples of this innovation cycle. 
Firms experimented with them, and courts, especially the Supreme Court, subsequently endorsed 
their usage. As a result, that first experimentation became standard, and a new layer of 
experimentation began. See David Horton, The Shadow Terms: Contract Procedure and 
Unilateral Amendments, 57 UCLA L. REV. 605, 623–44 (2010) (providing a detailed history of the 
development and dissemination of arbitration clauses after Bank of America began the trend of 
unilateral, postformation contract amendment). 
 210.  Choi & Gulati, supra note 201, at 938. 
 211.  Margaret Jane Radin, Boilerplate Today: The Rise of Modularity and the Waning of 
Consent, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1230 (2006) (explaining that contract terms “become part of 
the product, which is a unified set of disparate features: a battery, a forum selection clause, a 
microprocessor”); Douglas G. Baird, The Boilerplate Puzzle, 104 MICH. L. REV. 933, 933 (2006) 
(“The warranty that comes with your laptop computer is one of its many product attributes.”); 
Arthur Allen Leff, Contract as Thing, 19 AM. U. L. REV. 131, 142 (1970); see also Oren Bar-Gill 
& Kevin Davis, Empty Promises, 84 S. CAL. L. REV. 1, 19 (2010) (explaining how unilateral 
modification rights tend to allow firms to propose changes that “increase their profits, regardless 
of the adverse consequences to consumers”). 
 212.  See generally Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & Robert Taylor, Set in Stone: Change and 
Innovation in Consumer Standard-Form Contracts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REV. 240, 244 (2013) (finding 
that between 2003 and 2010 arbitration clauses became standard in end-user license agreements). 
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Unsurprisingly, consumer financial contracts have become less 
consumer friendly over time.213  
Although firms may hesitate to make changes to their contracts, 
they face few barriers when they decide to do so. Change is 
technologically easy, and the litigation and regulatory risks of making 
changes are low despite the myriad of consumer protection rules on the 
books.214 Lawmakers could change these rules, but as the next Section 
explains, their timeline for doing so is slow. 
2. Regulatory Innovation.  Although there is no comprehensive 
servicing regulation or regulator, there is a myriad of regulations 
governing bits and pieces of the servicing landscape.215 The most 
general of these regulations are state and federal prohibitions on fraud. 
The most specific of these regulations detail the format of disclosures 
that consumers must receive at various points in the contract. There 
are rules,216 standards, and a lively debate about which form of 
regulation more efficiently improves social welfare.217 There have also 
been a handful of proposals to intervene in the form of these consumer 
financial contracts more directly.218 
Despite these regulatory efforts, consumers regularly encounter 
inaccurate and sometimes illegal servicing.219 Consumers know there is 
a contract—indeed they are often receiving frequent reminders of their 
own obligations under the contract—but in practice, those contracts 
appear only to bind the consumer. Regulations in the consumer finance 
 
 213.  Id. 
 214.  See supra Part II.B. 
 215.  There is a long-running debate about the extent to which administrative supervision 
over the structure of contracts is appropriate and feasible. Compare OTTO PRAUSNITZ, THE 
STANDARDIZATION OF COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS IN ENGLISH AND CONTINENTAL LAW passim 
(1937) (advocating for administrative supervision), with Llewellyn, supra note 66, at 705 
(expressing doubt that administrative supervision will be able to keep pace with “constantly 
emerging” new fields).  
 216.  For example, Congress passed the FDCPA due to “abundant evidence of the use of 
abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices.” 15 U.S.C. § 1692(a).  
 217.  See generally BARR, MULLAINATHAN & SHAFIR, supra note 158 (applying regulatory 
analysis to financial service policies). 
 218.  See, e.g., Oren Bar-Gill & Elizabeth Warren, Making Credit Safer, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 
98–99 (2008) (proposing to regulate consumer contracts like other consumer products).   
 219.  Just at the CFPB is a steady drip of new enforcement actions and settlements pertaining 
to long-established rules and regulations. See Enforcement Actions, CONSUMER FIN. PROT. 
BUREAU, https://www.consumerfinance.gov/policy-compliance/enforcement/actions/?page=2 
[https://perma.cc/LT8K-MD9D] (last updated June 29, 2020) (cataloging enforcement actions). 
Of course, reported enforcement actions are only the tip of the iceberg. Many other firms receive 
nonpublic warning letters or have errors slip past regulators for years.  
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space may be little more than window dressings if they do not actually 
produce accurate, payable bills. A growing chorus of commentators 
has noted poor servicing harms the legitimacy of our court and 
regulatory systems, which fail to make consumer financial contracts 
binding on firms as well as consumers.220  
Perhaps more common still is for regulatory obligations to get 
ahead of the realities of firm technology. For example, in 2011 the 
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure were amended to include Rule 
3002.1, which at the time required mortgage lenders to consumers in 
bankruptcy to file a notice every time the amount of their monthly 
payment changed.221 Lenders were supposed to file this notice twenty-
one days before the new payment was due.222 For some mortgage 
products, the amount owed each month depends on the number of days 
in the month. To comply with this obligation, a lender would need to 
process any payment received from the last month, generate a notice, 
verify the notice, and file it within a week if it was going to meet the 
twenty-one-day deadline.223 Technology has made many processes 
quicker, but this particular timeline was too tight for the available 
technology. After several years of trying to make it work, the rule was 
amended in 2018 to allow courts to set different procedures for 
providing notices on some accounts where the payment amount 
regularly changes.224  
In sum, regulations proceed on their own innovation timelines. 
While they may strive to bend firm behavior towards compliance, 
technological limitations may make compliance impossible. In that 
case, the choice is to amend the regulation or remove the product from 
the market altogether. In some cases, amending the regulations to 
accommodate technological limitations will be the least bad option.  
 
 220.  Hoffman, supra note 201, at 392; Daphna Kapeliuk & Alon Klement, Contractualizing 
Procedure 44 (Dec. 31, 2008) (unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/ 
papers.cfm?abstract-id=1323056 [https://perma.cc/5VWN-Y72V]; see also Katherine Porter, 
Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy Mortgage Claims, 87 TEX. L. REV. 121, 179 (2008) 
(“[M]ost defaults and pending foreclosures occur outside the bankruptcy system. Thus, most 
families in default on their mortgages lack the protections—albeit, the existing weak 
protections—of the bankruptcy claims process to shield them from impermissible or unreasonable 
default fees.”). 
 221.  FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002.1(b) (2011). 
 222.  Id. 
 223.  Jerry D. Truitt, Rule and Form Changes Effective Dec. 1, 2011, 30 AM. BANKR. INST. J., 
Dec. 2011, at 14, 14.  
 224.  FED. R. BANKR. P. 3002.1(b) (2018). 
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3. Technology Innovation.  In servicing, contract and regulatory 
innovations require technology innovations. As explained above, 
servicing technology is what performs the contracts, and therefore, it 
must accommodate both the terms of the contracts and the regulations 
that govern them.225 Unfortunately, for many firms, technology 
innovations are challenging. 
No matter how well planned, technology projects are risky 
endeavors. Research in other industries suggests technology projects 
often take more time and resources than originally budgeted, and they 
rarely deliver all of the anticipated benefits.226 Seemingly benign 
technology projects sometimes turn into black-swan loss events.227 
There is no reason to think consumer financial contract servicing is 
immune to these risks. Any contractual or regulatory change must be 
coded into the SOR and however many adjacent records systems the 
firm maintains.228 Because servicing is a series of interdependent 
actions, small changes in the contracts with consumers can require 
extensive coding revisions. Each revision to code creates a risk that the 
calculations will go astray. Each revision is also a cost the company 
making the contract would prefer to minimize. 
These are not glamorous jobs that attract top talent and that 
warrant layers of oversight. Basic coding is blue-collar work.229 
Cynically, we might even expect very talented coders would prefer 
more exciting jobs than back-office positions at financial institutions.230 
Moreover, because servicing is, as explained above, not necessarily a 
metric on which firms compete, we might expect them to minimize 
their investments in the personnel working in servicing functions. If 
information technology positions are perceived as being less 
prestigious, they may be less able to attract and retain talent. At the 
same time, underinvestment in technology staff can create 
maintenance backlogs and time pressures that are not conducive to 
 
 225.  See supra Part I.B. 
 226.  Michael Bloch, Sven Blumberg & Jürgen Laartz, Delivering Large-Scale IT Projects on 
Time, on Budget, and on Value, MCKINSEY DIGIT. (Oct. 1, 2012), https://www.mckinsey.com/ 
business-functions/mckinsey-digital/our-insights/delivering-large-scale-it-projects-on-time-on-
budget-and-on-value [https://perma.cc/Z589-VNNX]. 
 227.  Bent Flyvbjerg & Alexander Budzier, Why Your IT Project May Be Riskier Than You 
Think, HARV. BUS. REV., Sept. 2011, at 23, 23. 
 228.  See supra Part I.B. 
 229.  Zohar Lazar, The Next Big Blue-Collar Job Is Coding, WIRED (Feb. 8, 2017, 12:30 PM), 
https://www.wired.com/2017/02/programming-is-the-new-blue-collar-job [https://perma.cc/W7P2-
DCXF].  
 230.  See supra note 106 and accompanying text. 
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meticulous work. Here, the details matter. Simple coding problems can 
lead to massive servicing errors.  
To be sure, there will always be some amount of technical debt 
and bugginess in these systems. The cost of maintaining perfect 
servicing technology may raise the cost of consumer finance to 
unacceptable levels or even reduce competition in the market as 
smaller firms are unable to make necessary technology investments. 
That imperfections will persist is not an argument for accepting 
technology that consistently produces customer harm. Consumer 
finance firms need incentives to find the middle position in the 
maintenance of their software systems. 
Many consumer finance firms rely on proprietary software 
systems to service their contracts. These proprietary systems have a 
steep learning curve for new IT hires. Further complicating ongoing 
technology maintenance and development, these systems typically 
include significant technological debt. For example, Ocwen, one of the 
largest mortgage servicers, relied on proprietary servicing software 
that “generated errors because of system failures and deficient 
programming.”231 The CFPB found “Ocwen tried manual 
workarounds” where its software was deficient, but these workarounds 
“often failed to correct inaccuracies and produced still more errors.”232 
Ocwen knew this. In internal communications, its own Head of 
Servicing described its proprietary system as “[a]n absolute train 
wreck”: “I can’t tell you the number of hours I and others spend on 
basic servicing technology blocking and tackling. I’m not talking about 
differentiators here. I’m talking about getting [the] system to stay 
online . . . letters to print.”233 Years of consultant reports and internal 
risk analysis reached similar conclusions.234 Ocwen relied on “more 
than 10,000 comment codes and flags” to move loans through its 
system, but “did not have a data dictionary to define these codes and 
describe their impact on other activities.”235 Despite knowing about 
these technological deficiencies for years, Ocwen did not make the 
investment to revamp its technology from the ground up. 
 
 231.  Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, supra note 123. 
 232.  Id. 
 233.  Complaint at 14, CFPB v. Ocwen Fin. Corp., No. 9:17-CV-80495 (S.D. Fla. Apr. 20, 
2017).  
 234.  Id. at 14–16. 
 235.  Id. at 16–17. 
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The data in any one proprietary system are not necessarily 
compatible with the data in a different proprietary system. This means 
as firms sell customer accounts, data easily become corrupted—
inaccessible or riddled with inaccuracies—or dependent on manual 
processes to integrate with the new technology platform.236 This 
problem is well documented in the struggle to adopt electronic health 
records (“EHR”). In 2004, President George W. Bush signed an 
executive order establishing the Office of the National Coordinator “to 
provide leadership for the development and nationwide 
implementation of an interoperable health information technology 
infrastructure.”237 Since then, the federal government has spent billions 
of dollars238 to encourage providers to adopt EHR and passed 
regulations requiring EHR developers to provide Application 
Programming Interfaces (“APIs”) so different systems can 
communicate and transfer data smoothly.239 Despite these efforts, 
when providers using different EHR systems need to transfer patient 
data, they still cannot rely on their EHR—the systems cannot 
communicate with each other, or only do so at significant added cost.240 
Instead, providers use fax machines.241 These data standardization 
problems remain sufficiently acute that the New York Times recently 
called out the fax machine as a “choke point” in the fight against the 
coronavirus.242 Transferring customer account files between different 
servicing platforms is similar and tends to require similar manual 
 
 236.  See, e.g., id. at 10 (“In many instances, the systems of record that other servicers use 
contain data fields that are different from the data fields in [Ocwen’s proprietary systems].”). 
 237.  Exec. Order No. 13,335, 69 Fed. Reg. 24,059 (Apr. 27, 2004), reprinted in 42 U.S.C. § 
300u.  
 238.  Dan Gorenstein, The Government May Want a Refund for Its $30 Billion Investment in 
Electronic Medical Records, MARKETPLACE (Apr. 14, 2016), https://www.marketplace.org/2016/ 
04/14/government-may-want-back-its-30-billion-investment-electronic-medical-records [https:// 
perma.cc/XH6V-JDKF]. 
 239.  45 C.F.R. §§ 170.215, 170.404 (2020). 
 240.  See Cheryl Rathert, Tracy H. Porter, Jessica N. Mittler & Michelle Fleig-Palmer, Seven 
Years After Meaningful Use: Physicians’ and Nurses’ Experiences with Electronic Health Records, 
44 HEALTH CARE MGMT. REV. 30, 31 (2019); Gorenstein, supra note 238. 
 241.  Asia Friedman, Jenna Howard, Eric K. Shaw, Deborah J. Cohen, Laleh Shahidi & 
Jeanne M. Ferrante, Facilitators and Barriers to Care Coordination in Patient-Centered Medical 
Homes (PCMHs) from Coordinators’ Perspectives, 29 J. AM. BD. FAM. MED. 90, 97 (2016). 
 242.  Sarah Kliff & Margot Sanger-Katz, Bottleneck for U.S. Coronavirus Response: The Fax 
Machine, N.Y. TIMES (July 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/13/upshot/coronavirus-
response-fax-machines.html [https://perma.cc/E9ZM-E3BU]. See generally Rachel Sachs, 
Integrating Health Innovation Policy, 34 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 41 (2021) (explaining the harms 
caused by noninteroperable EHR). 
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processes.243 Without a national standard for maintaining interoperable 
databases or other incentives to do the same, each company’s data 
remain in proprietary formats, customized for whatever conditions 
existed at the firm when it built its SOR.  
More modern programming languages, notably Ruby on Rails, 
solve for many of the pathologies found in proprietary systems like 
servicing platforms and EHR. One programming philosophy stands 
out as a potential antidote to the problems described above: 
convention over configuration. Convention over configuration tells 
developers to stick with defaults unless they absolutely need to make a 
change.244 This philosophy maximizes productivity because it 
“reduce[s] the decisions for developers while preserving flexibility.”245 
By reducing the number of decisions a developer must make and 
minimizing new code, it also reduces the risk of errors and unexpected 
behavior. Defaults set at the code level and used across organizations 
promote interoperability.  
These coding defaults in some ways mirror contractual formalities. 
Contracting parties use formalities to ensure courts will interpret their 
agreement in certain ways. Formalities are conventions that help 
ensure enforceability. Coding conventions are similar, but the 
computer stands in the place of the judge.  
This is not to say accuracy and interoperability problems would 
disappear if firms suddenly built new servicing platforms using this 
philosophy. Rather, it points to ways to make incremental but valuable 
progress towards better servicing.  
III. ERROR-RESILIENT CONSUMER CONTRACTS 
Formalities are a bit like coding conventions: they standardize 
how contracts and mortgages express essential data. Developers can 
and do code everything from scratch, but the consequence is future 
developers and adjacent systems may be less able to read the code. 
Similarly, transactions can and do proceed without formalities, but the 
 
 243.  Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, supra note 123. 
 244.  The official Ruby on Rails documentation describes it as follows: “Convention Over 
Configuration: Rails has opinions about the best way to do many things in a web application, and 
defaults to this set of conventions, rather than require that you specify minutiae through endless 
configuration files.” Getting Started with Rails, RUBY ON RAILS GUIDES, 
https://guides.rubyonrails.org/getting_started.html [https://perma.cc/T2UQ-KW53]. 
 245.  Yijun Yu, Yu Lin, Zhenjiang Hu, Soichiro Hidaka, Hiroyuki Kato & Lionel Montrieux, 
Maintaining Invariant Traceability Through Bidirectional Transformations, 34TH INT’L CONF. ON 
SOFTWARE ENG’G (ICSE) 540, 540 (2012). 
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consequence is the parties will be less able to enforce their agreement 
in court—the court may decline to read the contract. 
Where modern coding has moved towards forms as its uses 
diversify, the law has done the opposite. The seal, the wet signature, 
and possibly the entire doctrine of consideration have been relegated 
to the curio cabinet. We ask law students to include these forms in their 
mental inventories of the law, but their use case shrinks a little each 
year.  
Despite this trend, a few corners of the law preserve their 
formalities, notably at the borders of property law: secured 
transactions, wills, copyright. The relative success of these formalities 
in dealing with the timeless problems of evidence, intent, and 
enforceability—even in the face of significant societal changes—
suggests formalities may be useful yet. While any form may be 
ridiculous in some, or even many applications, as Fuller notes, the 
problem that the form attempts to solve nonetheless persists.246 
Eliminating the form does not eliminate the problem. 
Since secured transactions cover home loans, auto loans, and 
secured financing of many consumer goods, this field of law covers 
large classes of consumer financial contracts. Formalities have 
accompanied secured transactions since its earliest days.247 And while 
the stakes of lending formalities have decreased over time,248 they 
remain high stakes for most parties asserting a security interest in 
property.249 Writing about mortgages, Dana argues legislators “err in 
eliminating formalities from substantive law”250 in part because strict 
adherence to formalities prevents transactions from becoming complex 
to the detriment of consumers.251 If this is true, then consumer financial 
contracts may well benefit from increased formalities. 
More importantly, these formalities in secured transactions have 
produced pockets of relatively accurate data, even where whole 
 
 246.  Fuller, supra note 51, at 824. 
 247.  Grant Gilmore, Security Law, Formalism and Article 9, 47 NEB. L. REV. 659, 661 (1968). 
 248.  Id. at 663, 668 (tracing secured transactions’ move away from strict rules such as those 
in Benedict v. Ratner, 268 U.S. 353 (1925)).  
 249.  See id. at 675. Some security interests, notably purchase money security interests, are 
exempt from the filing formalities. See, e.g., In re Motors Liquidation Co., 777 F.3d 100, 105 (2d 
Cir. 2015) (holding even a mistakenly filed UCC-3 termination statement was sufficient to 
terminate a lien). 
 250.  Dana, supra note 42. 
 251.  Id. 
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industries were otherwise mired in bad data.252 There is one key 
exception, the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems 
(“MERS”),253 but stricter interpretation of formalities could avoid a 
reprise. Used in this way, formalities—and structural improvements 
generally—present an opportunity for incremental progress towards 
accuracy in consumer financial contracts. On the front end, they may 
help the three timelines remain in sync. To the extent modularity and 
formalities promote standardization, they may act as an API for 
consumer accounts, helping them move smoothly across platforms. 
But, as the COVID-19 forbearance example that opened this 
Article shows, there will be cases when rigid data systems themselves 
become the problem because one of the timelines races ahead—in that 
case, the regulatory timeline—or because an individual consumer has 
a situation that does not map cleanly onto the current data framework. 
When this happens, formalities can be a lifeline for realigning the 
timelines. Knitters working on lacey or otherwise complex patterns will 
leave lifelines as they work so if they lose their place in the pattern, 
there is a checkpoint back to which they can rip out their work. Ideally, 
this checkpoint is a place where all of the stitches have been confirmed 
as correct. Writers do a version of this when they save a new version of 
their manuscript before implementing significant changes. Because 
servicing involves so many databases, and sometimes even multiple 
firms, dropping lifelines can be challenging. There is room for a 
formality to produce the data that firms need for lifelines.  
This Part explores how modularity and formalities can make 
consumer financial contracts more resilient to errors. That is, these 
structural improvements will reduce the number and complexity of 
errors and simplify redress when errors inevitably occur. 
A. Modularity 
For our purposes, modularity is a fancy word for a simple concept: 
discrete contractual terms. Professor Henry Smith defines modularity 
as a “device to deal with complexity by decomposing a complex system 
into pieces (modules), in which communications (or other 
interdependencies) are intense within the module but sparse and 
standardized across modules.”254 Given the complexity of servicing 
software, modularity is essential for accurate automated servicing.  
 
 252.  See supra Parts I–II. 
 253.  See infra Part IV.C.2. 
 254.  Smith, supra note 111. 
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Modularity will improve servicing by reducing the complexity of 
automation by making more data discrete, or nondependent on other 
data. In other words, specific terms governing payment calculation and 
processing need to become more modular to simplify the calculations 
that servicers must make every month. Simplifying payment 
calculation and processing will reduce the complexity of both servicing 
software and human interactions with customer accounts. Both should 
encourage more accurate servicing. 
This ex ante simplicity is essential to make the complexity of 
dealing with consumers manageable. That is, predictable firm-side 
behavior is more important when confronted with unpredictable 
consumer-side behavior or inherently variable inputs.255 The goal is to 
push unavoidable complexity into its own corner and minimize the 
sums of money it impacts. To the extent that these pockets require 
difficult-to-maintain software or human interaction, that risk would be 
sandboxed from the rest of the account. And if and where there are 
mistakes in the sandbox, account corrections should be small and, 
hopefully, more manageable for consumers. 
Suspense accounts illustrate how increasing consumer contract 
modularity may improve servicing outcomes. Currently, many 
consumer financial contracts specify any money that a consumer pays 
will be held in a separate account, the so-called suspense account.256 
The firm will only apply money from the suspense account to the 
balance owed on the customer’s account when there is enough money 
in the suspense account to cover an entire payment. Suspense accounts 
enable firms to avoid accepting partial payments. Because applying any 
payment to a customer’s account depends on receiving a complete 
payment, any calculation error in one input will create problems 
throughout the account. 
For example, if a customer owes $1,002 to their mortgage 
company on June 1 and makes a payment of $1,000 on May 25, the firm 
will hold the $1,000 in suspense until the customer adds another $2 to 
the account and pays any late fee charged on June 1 when the borrower 
“missed” the payment. If the consumer does not notice the issue and 
next pays $1,000 on June 25, that second payment will go to the 
suspense account. There will now be enough funds in the suspense 
 
 255.  For example, impounded mortgage payments include payments for local taxes and 
insurance. Since local tax rates and insurance premia change, these payments must also change. 
12 C.F.R. § 1024.17(b), (i) (2021).  
 256.  See supra Part I.B.5. 
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account to cover the payment due on June 1 so the firm will apply those 
funds to the customer’s account. The customer will then not have 
sufficient funds to cover the July 1 payment and, where allowed, may 
even incur additional fees.257 This process may repeat indefinitely until 
the consumer notices the problem.  
This example shows how complex, nonmodular contracts are 
profitable to firms.258 If they were not, firms would not use them. This 
suggests any move towards modularity will require state intervention 
because, as discussed above, consumers lack the power to negotiate 
contracts to their preferences.  
The choice between modularity and context dependency is itself a 
form of regulation, regardless of whether courts or legislatures make 
that choice. As regulation, it decreases the options available to firms as 
they develop new products. Achieving significant modularity will 
require substantive changes to many consumer financial contracts, 
including some that may reduce firms’ profits. 
B. A New Formalities Framework 
Fuller theorized formalities have three functions: evidentiary, 
cautionary, and channeling.259 According to Fuller, these functions are 
not discrete: a seal may simultaneously serve evidentiary, cautionary, 
and channeling functions.260 Fuller argues a form serving one function 
will tend to serve others.261 The most effective forms are those that 
serve multiple functions. Those that do not risk veering into mere 
performance and meaninglessness. 
Keeping in mind the tendency of forms to have overlapping 
functions, consumer financial contracts reveal another function of 
forms: the benchmarking function. While Fuller’s three functions are 
internally focused on the parties to a transaction and the judges who 
might hear disputes between the parties, the benchmarking function is 
primarily useful to third parties such as regulators or consumers 
shopping for a contract counterparty. 
 
 257.  In addition to the FTC’s prohibition on pyramiding late fees, several recent regulations 
prohibit creditors from charging late fees on late fees alone. For example, the Rental Housing 
Late Fee Fairness Amendment Act of 2016 prohibits landlords in the District of Columbia from 
taking a late fee out of the next month’s rent payment. D.C. CODE § 42–3505.31 (2021). 
 258.  See Porter, supra note 220, at 127 (explaining how keeping customers in default can be 
profitable to servicers). 
 259.  Fuller, supra note 51. 
 260.  Id. at 803. 
 261.  Id. 
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Because the main problems in servicing are data problems at their 
core, forms that produce and simplify data may offer solutions. To be 
sure, no form is going to create perfect firm-side compliance overnight, 
but the test must be whether forms are an efficient tool for improving 
servicing. 
1. Evidentiary Formalities.  First, in their evidentiary function, 
formalities prove the existence of the contract “in case of 
controversy.”262 The statute of frauds and state land recording acts are 
prime examples of this function. By requiring evidential formalities, 
parties and courts can resolve disputes by looking to the documents 
instead of probing the parties’ potentially competing recollections of 
their agreement. Knowing documentation will be the preferred 
evidence in a dispute should incentivize the parties to create 
documents that reflect their agreement. 
Professors Ian Ayers and Robert Gertner expand on Fuller’s 
conception of the evidentiary function to argue formalities also inform 
“the parties within the contract.”263 The writing provides the parties 
with additional manifestations of the other party’s intent and thereby 
helps resolve any misunderstandings that may exist between the 
parties.  
This evidentiary function also helps outsiders understand the 
scope and boundaries of others’ rights. Professor Christopher 
Sprigman argues copyright formalities facilitated licensing by making 
it easier for would-be licensees to identify which rights were subject to 
copyright and who, if anybody, held those rights.264 The same is true of 
land recording formalities which ostensibly provide notice to the world 
of who controls what space. These formalities first and foremost 
provide evidence parties use to avoid disputes that would otherwise 
end up in court. When that fails, these formalities provide evidence 
parties can use to informally settle their disputes. For example, the 
allegedly infringing party might, upon inspection of the formality, 
voluntarily cut a sample out of a song or move a fencepost. Finally, if 
voluntary conflict resolution fails, the formalities might be evidence in 
a formal case.  
For consumers and other less sophisticated parties these 
misunderstandings may be more fundamental misconceptions of the 
 
 262.  Id. at 800.  
 263.  Ayres & Gertner, supra note 33. 
 264.  Sprigman, supra note 36. 
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agreements into which they enter. The writing, and the opportunity to 
review it over the course of performance, is theoretically useful for 
helping consumers understand the bargain they struck. This theory is 
the basis for mandatory disclosure rules, such as the Truth in Lending 
Act (“TILA”), that add a layer of formalities onto certain kinds of 
contracts.265 Of course, this theory fails where consumers do not, and 
especially where they cannot, read their contracts and the formalities 
attached to them.  
2. Cautionary Formalities.  Second, in their cautionary function, 
formalities force parties to take deliberate action to deter 
“inconsiderate action.”266 Fuller describes the seal: “The affixing and 
impressing of a wax wafer—symbol in the popular mind of legalism and 
weightiness—was an excellent device for inducing the circumspective 
frame of mind appropriate in one pledging his future.”267 Although the 
seal is all but dead, waiting periods, boldface text, and mid-document 
requests for initials all perform the same function. These formalities 
are a call to stop and think about whether the obligation is truly 
desirable. These formalities may be particularly useful in consumer 
financial contracts beyond mortgages and credit cards where 
consumers may be less aware they are entering into an agreement that 
may obligate them to make periodic payments, such as phone or even 
medical bills. 
There is one function the law often looks to formalities to perform 
but which they do not fill well: disclosure.268 Cautionary formalities 
might signal the significance of the agreement into which a party is 
about to enter, but they cannot convey specific information about that 
agreement to any party. The success of the older secured transactions 
formalities stands in contrast to the regulatory formalities more 
recently inserted into the consumer credit process. These new 
formalities are almost all disclosures. The problem they target is 
consumers allegedly making bad deals because they do not understand 
the terms of the obligations for which they sign up. Formalized 
disclosures, like those for credit cards and the TILA paperwork that 
accompanies new home loans, may succeed as cautionary formalities 
 
 265.  See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1604 (describing disclosure guidelines); id. § 1606(c) (describing 
allowable tolerances for disclosure compliance).  
 266.  Fuller, supra note 51, at 800. 
 267.  Id. 
 268.  But see Ayres & Gertner, supra note 33 (arguing formalities may protect the “relatively 
uninformed” by forcing parties to transfer information). 
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in that they convey to consumers these agreements are a big deal. But 
there is little evidence they are changing consumer behavior. That is, 
these disclosures might convey an agreement is important, but might 
not achieve the desired reaction of causing the consumer to read the 
agreement carefully and ask questions. Knowing what to do in a 
situation is different from knowing the situation carries meaning and 
consequence. The formalities only indirectly target their purpose and 
therefore do not always get there.  
Opportunistic parties may manipulate formalities to make 
enforceable agreements that judges might otherwise find void.269 This 
risk is especially high when the law relies on formalities to overcome 
the kinds of substantive safeguards, such as unconscionability, which 
have long given balance, and even legitimacy, to the law of contracts.  
3. Channeling Formalities.  And third, channeling formalities push 
the terms or attributes they govern into specific formats. Both 
transacting parties and courts then privilege those formats over others 
that do not align with the formality. By specifying certain formats for 
privileged treatment, the formality promotes standardization. Fuller 
explains that formalities “furnish[] a simple and external test of 
enforceability.”270 He continues, “One who wishes to communicate his 
thoughts to others must force the raw material of meaning into defined 
and recognizable channels.”271 Professor Karl Llewellyn described 
these formalities as the “definite marks which shall at once include the 
promises which ought to be enforceable, exclude those which ought not 
to be, and signalize those which will be.”272 Jhering’s example of these 
forms is the stamp on a coin, which “relieves us from the necessity of 
testing the metallic content and weight—in short, the value of the 
 
 269.  See Fuller, supra note 51, at 823 (speculating that the Uniform Written Obligations Act 
will probably cause parties “to add a line or two to unread printed forms and increased 
embarrassment to the task of judges seeking a way to let a man off from an oppressive bargain 
without seeming to repudiate the prevailing philosophy of free contract”); Posner, supra note 33, 
at 1983 (arguing formalities are inherently unstable because judges will bend them to avoid 
opportunistic behavior). 
 270.  Fuller, supra note 51, at 801. 
 271.  Id. at 802. 
 272.  Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?—An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704, 
738 (1931). 
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coin.”273 This external test of enforceability is essential to both parties 
to transactions and courts274—a manifestation of intent.275 
The standardization channeling formalities promote creates a 
lingua franca for transacting parties, thereby reducing their transaction 
costs. For example, if a formality requires lenders to disclose APR 
calculated in a particular way in a box on the last page of a contract, 
then consumers can shop by simply comparing the boxes. Without 
channeling the data into that format, consumers would have to 
standardize the terms themselves to accurately compare competing 
APRs. Notice here the formality does not necessarily cause consumers 
to have a sophisticated understanding of APR. Instead, it reduces the 
more complex concept into a single number that can be compared with 
other numbers. The number in the box is a useful abstraction, almost 
like a star rating. The consumer can rely on that number much like they 
can trade coins at a store without knowing their actual metallic content 
and weight. 
This function can seem opaque, but it should be familiar to 
students of property theory. The channeling function of formalities 
echoes the numerus clausus principle in property. In civil law, numerus 
clausus provides that rights must abide certain forms to be property 
rights; otherwise they must sound elsewhere in the private law.276 
Professors Thomas Merrill and Henry Smith have argued the common 
law recognizes the same principle, even if it does not have an explicit 
name for it.277 Limiting property to certain forms reduces the 
measuring costs in transactions for both the parties to the transaction 
and potential successors in interest, as well as for other market 
participants.278 Returning to the example of the coin, if the stamp 
always indicates the value of the coin because no one may claim 
ownership of an increment of the coin less than the stamp, anyone 
receiving a coin can be more or less confident of the value received.  
 
 273.  Fuller, supra note 51, at 801 (quoting RUDOLPH JHERING, II2 GEIST DES RÖMISCHEN 
RECHTS (8th ed. 1923)).  
 274.  Id. 
 275.  Id. 
 276.  Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, Optimal Standardization in the Law of Property: 
The Numerus Clausus Principle, 110 YALE L.J. 1, 4 (2000). 
 277.  Id. at 20.  
 278.  Id. at 27–28. 
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Although formalities have become less prominent in many areas 
of the law,279 they remain a feature of property. So formalities prevail 
in intellectual property, wills,280 and, of course, secured transactions. 
Formalities make sense for property-like claims because these claims 
are supposed to be “good against the world.”281 For property claims to 
be uniformly recognized, they need some degree of uniformity. Indeed, 
Merrill and Smith claim “central difference between contract and 
property concerns the freedom to ‘customize’ legally enforceable 
interests.”282 And so, property only exists in certain, predetermined 
forms.283 What does not fit into those forms is not property—in most 
cases, it is contract. The purpose of limiting property to certain forms 
is to protect future individuals who interact with the property from 
inefficient fragmentation,284 particularly over time.285 
Returning to the idea of consumer contracts as products, a few 
examples show these contracts are as defeasible as most property, even 
if the vocabulary does not track. A firm selling a contract to a debt 
collector is not functionally different from the same firm selling an 
apartment building. If the same firm sells the servicing rights to its 
contracts, it is functionally hiring a building management company. 
The company purchasing the servicing rights can no more change the 
consumers’ contracts than the building management company can 
change the tenants’ leases.  
Concerns about accurate servicing, then, are analogous to 
concerns about inefficient fragmentation in property. Where systems, 
whether legal regimes or software, expect inputs in one particular 
format but receive them in another, chaos abounds. In property, that 
chaos may result in inefficient uses of the property, particularly 
 
 279.  See Francis E. Holahan, Contract Formalities and the Uniform Commercial Code, 3 
VILL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1957) (“Other legal forms have been done away with.”). 
 280.  John V. Orth, Wills Act Formalities: How Much Compliance Is Enough?, 43 REAL PROP. 
TR. & EST. L.J. 73, 74 (2008).  
 281.  James Y. Stern, Property’s Constitution, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 277, 298 (2013). 
 282.  Merrill & Smith, supra note 276, at 3. 
 283.  Id. 
 284.  Id. at 6; Michael A. Heller, The Boundaries of Private Property, 108 YALE L.J. 1163, 
1176 (1999). 
 285.  Id. at 1181–82.  
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underuse.286 In consumer contracts, that chaos results in undesirable 
servicing, particularly firm-side breach.287  
Channeling formalities are, on first impression, an odd fit for 
consumer financial contracts. In the modern economy of adhesion 
contracts where the product is the contract, the contract itself is the 
channeling formality. Even if the contract is incomplete—leaving key 
terms to the discretion of one party—or has not been read, the pretense 
of a contract makes the agreement enforceable. In this way, the 
contract itself has become the seal.  
Fuller warns opportunistic parties might manipulate channeling 
formalities to make some transactions legally enforceable that would 
not otherwise be so.288 This risk is especially acute if the contract—
whether on paper or by click—becomes a form itself. That is, if the 
mere inclusion of a contract determines enforceability without regard 
to the usual contract doctrines that determine enforceability. Indeed, 
there is a rich literature documenting adhesion contracts generally and 
consumer finance contracts more specifically. These contracts manifest 
an agreement to be found but no specificity on the terms—no meeting 
of the minds. This lack of specificity is no barrier to enforcement 
because the written agreement is sufficient to make the transactional 
framework legally enforceable.  
The contract-as-formality model tends to vitiate doctrines other 
than enforcement. This model is especially devastating to doctrines 
that police substantive fairness, but that would seem to be the point. 
Stranger still, this model undermines doctrines that police procedural 
fairness and with them, the integrity of contract law itself.  
One way to rescue the content of contract doctrine from the 
oblivion of contract-as-form is to add additional channeling forms. The 
goal is to preserve most of the certainty surrounding enforcement that 
the current model provides, while reinserting substance into consumer 
financial contracts.  
 
 286.  See id. at 1166 (explaining how the legal framework of property permits only certain 
forms to limit overfragmentation of property rights). 
 287.  Firm-side noncompliance with applicable laws and/or contract terms is likely the most 
common undesirable outcome. That said, many consumer contracts now allow unilateral 
amendment or contain other provisions that obscure what might previously have been firm-side 
breach. Horton, supra note 209, at 608–09. Reliance on these provisions may nevertheless be 
undesirable because they may tend to move the contract away from the bargain that the 
consumers believe they struck. See id. at 645–51. 
 288.  Fuller, supra note 51, at 803.  
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Regulations have already added channeling formalities to certain 
kinds of consumer finance contracts. For example, TILA requires 
lenders disclose information such as the interest rate of a loan.289 
Lenders must use a particular form to make these disclosures.290 That 
is, TILA’s formalities are literally forms. If the lender complies with 
the form, the loan is presumptively enforceable. Similarly, credit card 
agreements must contain the so-called “Schumer Box,” which lists, 
among other things, the card’s interest rate expressed as APR.291 
Failure to comply with these requirements does not make the loan 
agreements unenforceable in the sense that consumers get free money, 
but failure to comply can force firms into more fact-intensive 
adjudication in addition to facing liability for their regulatory 
failures.292 The TILA disclosure and Schumer Box are like Jhering’s 
stamp on the coin—they reveal certain characteristics about the 
documents and thereby relieve the parties to the transaction and courts 
from further investigation.  
Beyond ensuring enforceability, formalities like the TILA 
disclosure and Schumer Box serve two additional goals as channeling 
formalities. First, like the weight stamped on the coin, they convey to 
the consumer the substantive value of the contract. The evidence of the 
effectiveness of this message remains mixed.293 But even if these 
formalities have little impact on consumer behavior, they may still 
impact firm behavior in ways that promote better contracts and 
perhaps even better compliance with the firms’ contractual and 
regulatory obligations. 
Channeling formalities will promote firm-side compliance with 
contracts if they channel firms’ obligations into formats that better 
interface with servicing technology than current contracts. For 
example, the payment schedule proposed above might channel 
contractual obligations towards those that an ex ante schedule can 
efficiently capture. Making the schedule itself might be a useful 
 
 289.  12 C.F.R. § 1026.18 (2021). 
 290.  See Closing Disclosure with Truth in Lending Act Disclose Citations, CONSUMER FIN. 
PROT. BUREAU (May 2016), https://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/documents/201605_cfpb_closing-
disclosure-with-truth-in-lending-act-disclosure-citations.pdf [https://perma.cc/9QKL-J97J]. 
 291.  See Fair Credit and Charge Card Disclosure Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-583, 102 Stat. 
2960 (requiring the disclosure of information by credit card issuers in a bill sponsored by Senator 
Chuck Schumer). 
 292.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1640. 
 293.  Talia B. Gillis, Putting Disclosure to the Test: Toward Better Evidence-Based Policy, 28 
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 31, 65–69 (2015); Lacko & Pappalardo, supra note 117. 
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calculation exercise—after all, any difficulty a firm faces in making the 
ex ante calculations is likely to reappear in monthly statements and 
other documents servicing software generates. A requirement that 
firms reproduce channeling formalities whenever they change or are 
forced to change the terms of a contract might insure contracts remain 
date friendly over time.  
4. Benchmarking Formalities.  Formalities allow parties to 
demonstrate their attention to detail over a standardized unit. Where 
infinite configuration may be the hallmark of contract,294 formalities 
offer a small-scale opportunity for an apples-to-apples comparison of 
the quality of the contracting party. Formalities reveal the quality of 
the party offering the contract, not of the goods or service that 
comprise the subject of the contract. So if there are a few fiddly 
formalities that are either public or findable with average diligence, 
parties can observe whether their potential counterparty is the kind of 
company that pays attention to details. Compliance with formalities 
might signal better compliance generally. The signal might be noise, 
but it is nonetheless meaningful. 
Benchmarking formalities are abundant outside the law. The most 
pervasive is orthography, more commonly called spelling.295 Although 
the American English language is riddled with alternative spellings,296 
most words have one or two “correct” spellings. Without a formal 
authority on spelling,297 the acceptable forms are subject to some 
degree of popular interpretation. Nonstandard forms may be 
recognizable and preferable in some instances, especially humor. But 
incorrect spellings of common words are obvious. As anyone who has 
read a stack of handwritten exams can attest, nonstandard spelling is 
not always an impediment to comprehension. But it is a signal 
nonetheless. One study has suggested some readers of online reviews 
view typographical errors—for example, “wsa” instead of “was”—as 
 
 294.  Merrill & Smith, supra note 276, at 3. 
 295.  See Fuller, supra note 51, at 803 (“If language sometimes loses valuable distinctions by 
being too tolerant, the law has lost valuable institutions, like the seal, by being too liberal in 
interpreting them.”). 
 296.  RICHARD L. VENEZKY, THE AMERICAN WAY OF SPELLING: THE STRUCTURE AND 
ORIGINS OF AMERICAN ENGLISH ORTHOGRAPHY 6 (1999). 
 297.  Other modern languages go through more formal spelling reforms. For example, the Rat 
für deutsche Rechtschreibung (Council for German Orthography) is an international body 
responsible for German spelling while the Académie Française (French Academy) governs the 
official spelling of French and adoption of new French words.  
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evidence of carelessness, causing them to trust the review less.298 These 
readers were more forgiving of orthographical errors that signal a lack 
of knowledge instead of a lack of care. Grammar works much in the 
same way as spelling. Compliance with spelling and grammar norms—
or more precisely, avoidance of typos—is a signal for thoughtfulness 
beyond spelling and grammar.299 
In this way, benchmarking formalities may assist parties in 
shopping among prospective counterparties. A formality need not be 
directly observable by shoppers—consumers or firms selling servicing 
rights to their contracts—to assist in their decision-making process as 
long as the media or regulators are able to observe adherence to these 
formalities and digest their observations into findings shoppers can use. 
Either way, adherence to benchmarking formalities can become part 
of a firm’s reputation. Given the weakness of both public and private 
enforcement regimes,300 reputational concerns may be a key motivator 
for compliance.301 
Compliance with formalities may also be a signal for regulators 
about which firms are most likely to be struggling with compliance. If 
a firm cannot reliably comply with formalities, perhaps its internal 
processes are overwhelmed more generally. After all, a firm is 
expected to prioritize compliance with obligations that are easiest for 
regulators to monitor. Comparing different firms’ approaches to 
formalities could provide regulators with information about an 
industry and allow them to intervene before quality standards erode 
industry-wide. 
The “robosigning” scandals of the Foreclosure Crisis exemplify 
this function. Many states and courts require lenders or servicers to 
attest they have verified the information they are submitting to the 
court.302 This verification usually takes the form of a signature 
 
 298.  Dena Cox, Jeffrey G. Cox & Anthony D. Cox, To Err Is Human? How Typographical 
and Orthographical Errors Affect Perceptions of Online Reviewers, 75 COMPUTS. HUM. BEHAV. 
245, 247 (2017).  
 299.  See id. (noting that “typographical errors are often attributed to carelessness”). 
 300.  See supra Part II.B. 
 301.  Donald C. Langevoort, Monitoring: The Behavioral Economics of Corporate 
Compliance with Law, 2002 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 71, 79 (describing reputational harm as a cost 
of noncompliance); Danielle D’Onfro, Corporate Stewardship, 44 J. CORP. L. 439, 447 & n.50 
(2019) (same). 
 302.  See, e.g., Edward J. Balleisen & Melissa B. Jacoby, Consumer Protection After the Global 
Financial Crisis, 107 GEO. L.J. 813, 832 (2019) (explaining attestation requirements); see also 
Jacob L. White, “Robo-Signing”: A Symptom of the Shortcomings in Maryland’s Policy of 
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following an attestation and sometimes requires notarization.303 The 
sworn statement and signature constitute a classic formality. The CFPB 
and other regulators have found several examples of a single person 
allegedly signing more documents than they could possibly sign if they 
were actually verifying the contents of the document as they attest to 
have done.304 Documents signed without such verification are called 
“robosigned.”305 Upon further inspection, these regulators even 
noticed the signatures were inconsistent, suggesting several different 
people were signing one person’s name.306 Who signs what name on a 
document has no direct bearing on customer harm. Instead, the 
potential customer harm lies in what failure to adhere to the formality 
signals: no one was verifying the contents of the documents, and the 
firm did not take its compliance obligations seriously.307  
C. Implementation  
The success of reinvigorated formalities will depend, in part, on 
which institutions promulgate them. To the extent formalities are 
already on the books, the onus is on state supreme courts to recommit 
their jurisdictions to enforcement of those formalities. In many 
instances, case law has developed to permit something other than strict 
 
Expediting Foreclosure Proceedings, 1 U. BALT. J. LAND & DEV. 81, 85–86 (2011) (explaining 
robosigning). 
 303.  E.g., OFFICIAL FORM 410S1: NOTICE OF MORTGAGE PAYMENT CHANGE 2, 
https://www.uscourts.gov/sites/default/files/form_b410s1.pdf [https://perma.cc/B9UD-2V3J].  
 304.  See Press Release, Consumer Fin. Prot. Bureau, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
Takes Action Against Payday Lender for Robo-Signing (Nov. 20, 2013), https:// 
www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-protection-bureau-takes-
action-against-payday-lender-for-robo-signing [https://perma.cc/4ZLN-T6UM].  
 305.  Balleisen & Jacoby, supra note 302, at 831 (defining robosigning as “the systemic 
practice of signing mortgage documents that attest to the validity of a company’s ownership of a 
mortgage debt without actual knowledge or confirmation of the loan’s chain of title and status”). 
 306.  Katy Stech, J.P. Morgan, Justice Department Reach $50 Million Robo-Signing 
Settlement, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 3, 2015, 4:21 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/j-p-morgan-justice-
department-reach-50-million-robosigning-settlement-1425399145 [https://perma.cc/E373-366C]. 
 307.  See Richard E. Gottlieb, James M. Golden & Brett J. Natarelli, The Foreclosure 
Firestorm: “Robo-Signing” Allegations Have More Bark Than Bite, 67 BUS. L. 649, 649 (2012) 
(recounting how a witness from GMAC Mortgage testified that employees were signing 
documents without verifying them); see also White, supra note 302, at 90–93 (arguing robosigning 
was a symptom of larger industry issues). 
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compliance by firms.308 Alternatively, legislatures could act to overrule 
decisions that undermine strict compliance.309 
New formalities will need coordination, likely at the national level, 
lest firms shop around them. Federal regulators could promulgate 
formalities, but their limited jurisdiction means there will be a 
patchwork of rules, with ostensibly similar companies facing different 
requirements based on who their regulator is. A better option is for a 
national organization like the Uniform Law Commission to 
promulgate rules that states can then adopt. Since contracts are 
primarily the creation of state law and dependent on state law for 
enforcement, state legislatures have the power to create rules that 
apply to contracts regardless of the identity of the firm in the contract. 
Standard formalities across industries are important in the consumer 
financial contract space because these contracts can all land in the same 
collections system if the consumer defaults.  
Reinvigorating formalities and promulgating new ones will blur 
the line between public and private law. Formalities—especially those 
incorporated into contract law—may be rooted in the private law, but 
they necessarily constrain the law inside publicly-chosen boundaries. 
Still, they may be a more palatable interference in the private law 
insofar as they largely target the process of contracting rather than the 
substance of the contract. Indeed, regulation through formalities 
promotes private ordering by helping the enforcement process hew 
more closely to the bargain struck at origination, regardless of whether 
it is the consumer or the firm enforcing the contract. 
New formalities would work like formalities of yore: failure to 
strictly adhere to them will limit the enforceability of agreements in 
court. Given the power imbalance between consumers and firms, it 
may be desirable to make noncompliant contracts wholly 
unenforceable. A middle position is to make noncompliant contracts 
ineligible for default judgments or subject to higher burdens of proof. 
Different consequences might make sense for different formalities. 
 
 308.  See, e.g., Colorow Health Care, LLC v. Fischer, 420 P.3d 259, 264–65 (Colo. 2018) 
(holding that, although the Colorado legislature required arbitration agreements to be in bold 
font, agreements not in bold font were nonetheless enforceable, and explaining that “[w]e don’t 
believe that the General Assembly intended to elevate form over function”). 
 309.  The process of rules becoming standards may then repeat itself. See Frederick Schauer, 
The Tyranny of Choice and the Rulification of Standards, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 803, 804–
05 (2005) (describing how rules “have their edges rounded upon application, interpretation, or 
enforcement”); Michael Coenen, Rules Against Rulification, 124 YALE L.J. 644, 656 (2014) 
(describing the “standard-ification” process). 
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D. Examples and Applications 
This Section sketches out two new formalities that may improve 
servicing. These proposals are proofs of concepts intended to inspire 
policy experts to think about whether formalities are the tool they need 
to improve servicing. 
1. Precommitted Billing.  One formality inspired by the disclosure 
formalities discussed in the Introduction is for firms to calculate a 
schedule of payments due over the term of the agreement or, for open-
ended agreements, over the next three years.310 This schedule would 
then be a static reference point that consumers could access in print or 
through their electronic accounts. If a firm needs to change the 
payments it expects from consumers, then it must republish the 
schedule to consumers. An example of such a schedule would be a 
mortgage’s amortization tables. If the agreement is long term, it could 
specify any fees the borrower should expect to owe if they pay thirty, 
sixty, or ninety days late. In a modular contract, the lateness of any one 
payment need not impact the calculation of future payments. The 
formality is the calculation and publication of the schedule. This 
formality is a precommitment to particular servicing outcomes.  
It is admittedly odd to identify precommitment as a noteworthy 
attribute of contracts. After all, what are contracts if not 
precommitments to fulfill certain obligations? But consumer 
contracting has slipped far enough from the platonic ideal of contract 
as a promise that precommitment is newly noteworthy. In a world in 
which consumers do not read contracts, much less negotiate them,311 
consumers’ expected terms often do not align with the terms rational 
firms will provide.312 This may be all the more true when firms have 
unilateral modification rights,313 especially the ability to add and 
change fees on a whim. In this environment, even the savviest 
consumers are unable to independently calculate what they owe on 
their bills each month. They simply lack the available information. 
Precommitment to servicing outcomes is one possible antidote. 
On its face, a published schedule offers consumers notice of what to 
expect, and in turn, gives them a benchmark against which to verify 
 
 310.  This kind of formality would not work for revolving debt. 
 311.  See Marotta-Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help?, supra note 32 (noting the 
overwhelming majority of consumers agree to terms without reading online contracts).  
 312.  Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 57, at 553. 
 313.  See Horton, supra note 209, at 623 (describing the practice of unilateral modification). 
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their current account status. Given how few consumers read their 
contracts,314 it is possible only a limited number of customers would 
read and follow the schedule. Instead, the main benefit for consumers 
might come if and when they receive a new schedule, which would alert 
them something on their account has changed. Highly motivated 
consumers might investigate, and if there is a problem, catch it early so 
that firms can fix errors before they become too deeply embedded in 
accounts.315 With data about what to expect on their accounts, those 
motivated customers would be less beholden to information provided 
only through customer service agents if and when their accounts 
require attention. Instead of an open-ended question about their 
payment, they would be able to ask why the bill does not match the 
schedule. Although potentially useful for a few motivated consumers, 
the published schedule’s main potential for improving compliance lies 
in its role as a formality. 
Such a publication would have three main functions. First, 
precommitted billing ensures an effective evidentiary formality. In a 
dispute between a consumer and a firm, it would be prima facia 
evidence of what the consumer owed. The law can incentivize firms to 
comply with the schedule by limiting default judgment and remedies 
like wage garnishment to the sums on the schedule. This data could be 
even more important at the collections phase, in which late fees and 
collection costs have often bloated balances owed.316 Compliance with 
the formality would drive the enforceability of the contract. Firms that 
want to enforce something other than what the schedule provides 
would need to update the schedule, thereby creating a detailed record 
of activity on the account.  
The formality would serve a limited cautionary function. As 
mentioned above, it may be useful for the few consumers who even 
attempt to read their contracts by causing them to contemplate the 
merits of the obligation before they commit. Better still, it would force 
firms to consider whether they can do the kinds of calculations that the 
contract requires. This formality would increase the cost of contracts 
with dynamic pricing and therefore marginally disincentivize them. 
 
 314.  Marotta-Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help?, supra note 32, at 179 (arguing that 
making disclosures more convenient does not increase the likelihood that consumers will read 
them). 
 315.  See generally Yonathan A. Arbel & Roy Shapira, Theory of the Nudnik: The Future of 
Consumer Activism and What We Can Do To Stop It, 73 VAND. L. REV. 929 (2020) (theorizing 
that a few highly motivated consumers can police firm behavior and improve compliance). 
 316.  Jiménez, supra note 86, at 68.  
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Finally, this kind of formality would be a benchmark for regulators 
supervising servicing. Regulators could first study whether firms were 
regularly producing the schedule and then, if need be, the substance of 
the schedule. In the latter, they would see whether the payment in the 
SOR matches the schedule. If it does not, regulators would have a 
strong signal they need to investigate further. At the same time, if a 
particular kind of contract persistently causes schedule issues, 
regulators would know they need to focus on those kinds of contracts.  
The functionality of these schedules would be amplified if they 
were somehow publicly available, but that would raise insurmountable 
privacy concerns.317 A less intrusive alternative would be to treat these 
schedules like tax records and make them available to a very limited 
number of private researchers who may in turn work with journalists.318 
The prospect of an apolitical party uncovering and publicizing their 
findings would incentivize better servicing. In the alternative, this kind 
of research could help regulators direct their limited resources to 
where they are most needed and help consumers shop between firms. 
The challenge with any schedule system is accounting for the 
complex, and at times non-compliant, behavior of consumers. Too rigid 
a system could easily create another snafu like the “022, Energy – 
Environment Costs” drop-down in Fannie Mae’s system. 
Firms will naturally oppose any requirement to publish payment 
tables or fee schedules to consumers for several reasons. Gathering and 
publishing this information will cost them money. This is especially true 
if they face litigation or uncertainty about what counts as publishing 
data to consumers. Publishing data may reveal their business practices 
to competitors or bring unwanted attention from journalists, 
researchers, and regulators. And in some cases, firms may prefer that 
consumers not know exactly what to expect over the life of their 
contract.  
Certainty about what to expect over the life of a contract could 
impact the sale value of these contracts.319 It is unclear which direction 
this cuts: If these innovations make enforcing these contracts more 
efficient, they should increase their sale value. On the other hand, if 
 
 317.  See infra Part IV.D.  
 318.  See Jeffrey Mervis, How Two Economists Got Direct Access to IRS Tax Records, 
SCIENCE (May 22, 2014), https://www.science.org/content/article/how-two-economists-got-direct-
access-irs-tax-records [https://perma.cc/7GUX-PLLT]. 
 319.  Davis, supra note 150, at 99 (“The value of a contract to the parties who adopt it may 
also depend on the extent to which third parties are uncertain about its effects.”). 
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these innovations ultimately reduce what secondary servicers can 
capture, the sale value should fall. Of course, a decrease in sale price is 
not a bad thing if it reflects better enforcement of the bargain the 
consumer made at formation. 
2. Registration.  Another potential set of formalities would be 
filing requirements and a registration system for unsecured consumer 
debt that captures customer account information at contract formation 
and charge off, if not more often. At least two private companies, 
Convoke Systems and Global Debt Registry, have attempted to build 
databases of private, unsecured debt to help solve some of the 
persistent data problems in collections.320 The CFPB and several state 
attorneys general had previously expressed support for a consumer 
debt registry, but no proposal has been forthcoming.321 
Although setting up a national registry would be a herculean task, 
its functional potential almost certainly outweighs the cost. A public 
registry would be strong evidence both for parties to debt-purchase 
agreements and to courts hearing collections proceedings. The 
publicness of the registry would amplify its cautionary function—how 
a firm actually treats its consumers would finally be on display. 
Moreover, a registry would be a powerful benchmarking tool for 
regulators and consumers, much like the schedule of precommitted 
bills discussed above. 
The most interesting function of a registry is its channeling 
function. A registry would channel data about contracts into the forms 
recorded in the registry. In doing so, the registry would standardize 
data about consumer debts. While this data is primarily useful within 
the recording system, it may provide standards that services can use in 
their own systems, and critically, as accounts move between 
servicers.322 At the same time, the mere presence of the registry may 
simplify contracts, thereby reducing the likelihood of servicing errors 
ex ante. 
 
 320.  Penny Crosman, One Way To Fix the Hot Mess That Is Debt Collections, AM. BANKER 
(Dec. 31, 2015, 2:30 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/news/one-way-to-fix-the-hot-mess-
that-is-debt-collections [https://perma.cc/2AYM-4HK2]. 
 321.  Id.  
 322.  A light version of this already occurs with information reported to the credit bureaus 
under the Metro 2 standard promulgated by the Consumer Data Industry Association, a trade 
group representing the credit bureaus. Metro 2® Format for Credit Reporting, CDIA, 
https://www.cdiaonline.org/resources/furnishers-of-data-overview/metro2-information [https:// 
perma.cc/XB4W-4RMG]. 
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IV. IMPLICATIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
This Part turns to the stakes of error-resilient contracts. Reducing 
errors, or at least making them easier to resolve, will bring compliance 
and legitimacy benefits, but there are limits and privacy concerns along 
the way. 
A. Improving Compliance 
The simplest goal of this framework of formalities is to reduce 
servicing errors. Reducing errors entails two things: adhering to the 
terms of the contract and meeting regulatory obligations. That is, 
reducing errors means improving compliance with both private law and 
public law obligations.  
To the extent these public and private obligations reflect customer 
expectations, these compliance improvements should reduce customer 
harm. Customer harm is both the direct financial burdens that poor 
servicing imposes on consumers as well as the more amorphous time 
and emotional costs. Time spent pleading with customer service 
representatives or worrying about a bill is time not spent on other 
productive activities. In extreme cases, customer harm can bleed 
beyond the direct consumers to their families, their communities, and 
into public social safety nets more generally.323 
Noncompliance, whether with contracts or regulatory obligations, 
would matter less if the resulting customer harm were easy to 
remediate. Unfortunately, on a personal level, many of the harms of 
poor servicing are incommensurable. As Professor Cass Sunstein 
explains, “Incommensurability occurs when the relevant goods cannot 
be aligned along a single metric without doing violence to our 
considered judgments about how these goods are best 
characterized.”324 Valuation of some harms, like an overcharge on the 
mortgage of a family home, might be comparatively easy.325 But what 
happens when poor servicing so dents a family’s finances that the 
 
 323.  See G. THOMAS KINGSLEY, ROBIN SMITH & DAVID PRICE, THE URB. INST., THE 
IMPACTS OF FORECLOSURES ON FAMILIES AND COMMUNITIES 22 (2009) (discussing the impact 
of foreclosures on communities). 
 324.  Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 MICH. L. REV. 779, 796 
(1994).  
 325.  Valuation of a house may be comparatively easy, but the value of any particular house 
to any particular family is a much more complex question. See Sunstein, supra note 324, at 797–
99 (discussing the difficulties of valuing certain personal experiences and objects). See generally 
Margaret Jane Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 STAN. L. REV. 957 (1982) (discussing how a 
person’s personal connection to an object may affect that person’s valuation of that object). 
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family moves to a less prosperous neighborhood with a less resourced 
school system?  
Today, customers alone bear these difficult-to-measure costs. 
Harms that are incompatible with easy valuation or are a few steps 
removed from the offending act are rarely factored into the damages 
consumers receive, if they are lucky enough to receive any 
compensation at all. Because so many of the harms associated with 
poor servicing are incommensurable, there is no clear path to make 
consumers more whole if and when these harms occur. In other words, 
it is far better to avoid servicing harms in the first place. 
Instead, increases in consumer protection must occur at the front 
end with better compliance. Improved compliance, even imperfect 
compliance, reduces customer harm. Even if it is impossible to 
eliminate customer harm, reducing it is a noble goal unto itself. 
Formalities, especially strict judicial enforcement of formalities, 
may improve ex ante compliance by slowing firms down and causing 
them to interact more carefully with the data in customer accounts.326 
That is, the cautionary function of formalities should work on firms just 
as it works on consumers.327 Ideally, formalities can force firms to 
optimize their servicing technology for their contracts. To do this, the 
formalities must be tied to the data on which accurate servicing 
depends. And if the formality does fail to improve servicing ex ante, its 
evidentiary function should reduce enforcement costs ex post. This, in 
turn, should create a virtuous cycle of deterrence and compliance. 
If formalities produce more useable data for regulators, they may 
make investigations more efficient and increase the likelihood any act 
of wrongdoing will be punished. The CFPB customer complaints 
database is an example of how this works. The Dodd-Frank Act 
requires the director of the CFPB to “establish a unit whose functions 
shall include establishing a single, toll-free telephone number, a 
website, and a database or utilizing an existing database to facilitate 
the centralized collection of, monitoring of, and response to consumer 
complaints regarding consumer financial products or services.”328 Each 
month, the CFPB publishes thousands of the complaints it receives on 
its website and semiannually provides a report to Congress analyzing 
 
 326.  See Dana, supra note 42, at 517 (“Insistence on strict compliance of servicers with 
procedural requirements might give leverage to [consumers] . . . .”). 
 327.  See supra Part III.B.2. 
 328.  12 U.S.C. § 5493(b)(3)(A). 
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the complaints.329 The CFPB is statutorily required to provide a timely 
response to complaints, including bringing formal enforcement actions 
where necessary.330 Similarly, the Federal Reserve System has begun to 
use data from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act to guide its fair 
lending actions.331 If structured to produce standardized data, 
formalities can provide similar resources for a broader range of 
consumer financial contracts. 
B. Legitimacy 
The inability of regulators and courts to bend firm behavior 
towards compliance contributes to the perception of lawlessness. This, 
in turn, erodes the legitimacy of our system of laws. Consumer 
expectations and the norms of contracts have disappeared into the 
technological fray of servicing. Given the intensity of the structural 
barriers they face in holding firms accountable,332 consumers are not 
wrong in feeling “the system” is rigged against them. As Dana explains, 
“One clear meaning of strict compliance would be that the legal system 
takes seriously not just the interests of wealthy corporations but also, 
and equally, those of struggling [consumers].”333 Our system of laws 
depends on firms and people being equal before the law and on people 
believing equality exists. The current reality in consumer law 
undermines that system. 
Formalities will help consumers overcome the structural barriers 
they face in court. As Fuller notes, formalities can increase the 
efficiency of adjudication.334 In the narrow sliver of cases in which 
consumers do receive an adjudication of their claims based on the 
merits, the right formalities will prove more efficient to enforce than 
any current claim. For example, if firms had to produce at formation a 
table of expected bills based on typical consumer payment behavior, 
consumers would not have to reconstruct what they believe they owe; 
instead, they would merely have to show the bill they received does not 
match the table. Prioritizing the precommitted table would shift the 
burden onto firms to introduce evidence about the parties’ obligations 
 
 329.  Id. § 5496(b), (c)(4). 
 330.  Id. § 5534(a). 
 331.  Id. §§ 2801–2811. 
 332.  See supra Part II.B.2. 
 333.  Dana, supra note 42, at 517. 
 334.  Fuller, supra note 51, at 801. 
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if those obligations diverge from the precommitted table. This shift 
would better align information burdens with capacity. 
Another step that would bolster the legitimacy of courts and make 
the formalities more meaningful is to reserve default judgment for 
cases in which the firms have strictly complied with all of the 
formalities. To the extent compliance with formalities is a signal for 
compliance generally,335 this rule will tend to reward accurate servicing. 
To the extent the formalities serve an evidentiary function, they may 
provide key evidence to both the firm and the consumer. The consumer 
may be partially freed from dependence on the firm to determine their 
obligations under the contract. In this way, evidentiary formalities will 
help smooth out some of the structural barriers that consumers face in 
private enforcement proceedings. Any step that mitigates these 
structural barriers increases the legitimacy of the court system. 
Courts are in a better position to police compliance with 
formalities than other regulatory or contractual obligations for three 
reasons. First, courts can directly observe compliance without 
additional arguments from the parties. Second, compliance will often 
be a binary choice336: Is there a seal, or is the seal missing? Third, if a 
court withholds default judgment because it believes the required 
formalities have not been met, the firm can always introduce additional 
evidence proving they satisfied the formalities. For this reason, a robust 
system of formalities will help courts and other fact finders more 
accurately assess compliance even when the parties have unequal 
representation in court.337  
C. The Limitations of Formalities 
1. Reputation-Immune Counterparties.  One way formalities might 
improve servicing is by providing a benchmark to measure firm 
behavior. Firms that are reputation sensitive are likely to worry about 
 
 335.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 336.  See Duncan Kennedy, From the Will Theory to the Principle of Private Autonomy: Lon 
Fuller’s “Consideration and Form,” 100 COLUM. L. REV. 94, 102 (2000) (explaining that reducing 
legal questions into forms eliminates substantive consideration of the question; for example, if 
consideration is a form, there is no need to analyze the adequacy of consideration).  
 337.  As Jhering and Kennedy observe, the cost of administrability is always under- and 
overinclusiveness. Id. at 113. The question then is whether the benefits of administrability 
outweigh the costs of accuracy. Id. In the context of consumer litigation, in which the consumer 
is often pro se, if they appear at all, the chance that consumers will be able to prove a complex 
factual case to the standards of the law is so slim that the benefits of prioritizing administrability 
seem obvious. 
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deviating from that benchmark because doing so could create 
unwanted attention, whether from regulators, investigative reporters, 
or even one-off stories in which the local media starts asking questions 
about a single contract. 
Precommitment to certain servicing outcomes may not motivate 
firms that are less reputation sensitive. There are several reasons 
companies are reputation immune. Servicing and collections 
companies only become party to a contract on the secondary market, 
where consumers have no say.338 The party choosing among servicers 
may care more about the price they will pay for servicing rights than 
the firm’s reputation for accurate servicing. These same companies are 
also often judgment proof, and the barriers for any owner or manager 
to start a new legal entity in the space are low. 
Many servicing and debt collection companies are virtually 
anonymous.339 Unable to escape a servicer except by paying a debt, 
consumers have little leverage. Firm reputation matters little. 
Other firms may be reputation immune because they have a 
monopoly or near monopoly. If only one firm provides internet service 
to a neighborhood, the residents of that neighborhood have little 
choice but to do business with that company. This is not to say all firms 
in low-competition environments will behave poorly, but rather their 
incentives for investing in better servicing is low.340 Large firms may 
struggle to offer any meaningful customization around consumer 
needs.  
Providers of emergency healthcare services and many hospitals 
are similar to collections firms or utilities. Consumers may have little, 
if any, opportunity to choose different contract partners, regardless of 
the facility’s reputation. At the same time, even when consumers do 
have a choice, the quality of the medical care provided is likely much 
more important to their decisions than the providers’ billing practices. 
As a result, the provider has little incentive to cultivate its reputation 
with respect to billing. 
 
 338.  Porter, supra note 220, at 126–27.  
 339.  BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RSRV. SYS., THE U.S. HOUSING MARKET: CURRENT 
CONDITIONS AND POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 24–25 (2012) (explaining that because servicer 
information is not recorded in land-use records, “parties with a legitimate interest in contacting 
the servicer have little to go on”). 
 340.  See generally TIM WU, THE CURSE OF BIGNESS: ANTITRUST IN THE NEW GILDED AGE 
(2018) (explaining how reductions in competition can lead to reductions in the quality of goods 
and services).  
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All of this is to say firms that exist outside the normal pressures of 
business and reputational risk are unlikely to change their behaviors 
because of any changes to the contracts they service. Formalities will 
increase the effectiveness of these levers only to the extent they reduce 
public and private enforcement costs and thereby increase legal risk. 
2. MERS as an Object Lesson.  Reducing consumer financial 
contracts to data is not without risk. If the data becomes disconnected 
from the whole, the relationship between the firm and the consumer 
can become more complex. And, as the Mortgage Electronic 
Registration Systems (“MERS”) proved during the recent foreclosure 
crisis, this complexity can irrevocably break the relationship.341 MERS 
maintains a database of mortgages and records the stakeholders of 
those mortgages, much in the way the public land records do.342 It 
facilitates mortgage assignments by becoming the nominee of lenders 
and providing “mailroom” services for lenders and servicers alike.343 
As long as MERS is the mortgage in public land records, there is no 
need to make additional filings for subsequent transfers. At the height 
of the foreclosure crisis, it was the mortgagee on over half of all 
residential mortgages.344 But unlike the public land records, MERS 
does not make its data public. MERS effectively removed information 
from the public records system and, in so doing, reduced the 
information consumers had about their contracts. 
MERS worked for firms because it complied with the formalities 
of the land use records, if not their spirit. Indeed, it arguably increased 
compliance with recordation laws because before its dominance, firms 
often ignored these laws.345 But it succeeded at the cost of actually 
making it more difficult to determine who owned a mortgage, 
especially as it became apparent MERS’ internal records were woefully 
incomplete.346  
Compliance with formalities is not enough to ensure good 
servicing. Instead, it merely helps prevent particular kinds of errors, 
namely data-accuracy errors. Consumers should benefit from reducing 
 
 341.  See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROPERTY: MORTGAGES § 5.4 (AM. L. INST. 1997) 
(explaining that the only the party holding the right to enforce a mortgage may do so). 
 342.  Dale A. Whitman, A Proposal for a National Mortgage Registry: MERS Done Right, 78 
MO. L. REV. 1, 14 (2013). 
 343.  Id.  
 344.  Dustin A. Zacks, MERS Is Dead: Long Live MERS, 44 CONN. L. REV. 62, 64 (2012). 
 345.  Whitman, supra note 343, at 38. 
 346. See Zacks, supra note 344, at 72.  
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this one kind of bad servicing, but stakeholders will need to vigilantly 
watch for innovations around the formalities.347 
D. Privacy 
Moving to a system of formalities that values publicness 
compromises privacy. The question is whether the benefits of the 
formalities outweigh the privacy costs.  
The exact privacy costs will depend on the details of any public 
formalities. In general, the more information exposed and the broader 
the exposure, the greater the risk of harm. Here, there are no easy 
solutions; even seemingly anonymous data may be re-identifiable.348 
Harms are likely to fall into two main buckets: direct economic harms 
and subjective emotional harms. 
Any time personal information is made public, there is a risk of 
identity theft and fraud. The more information available to criminals, 
the more likely they are to successfully open lines of credit in victims’ 
names or to gain access to their financial accounts. Nevertheless, it is 
notable that some longstanding formalities that produce publicly 
available data about individuals have not resulted in privacy disasters. 
To date, there is no evidence of widespread use of data from land 
recording systems for identity theft purposes.349 But, one cannot rule it 
out. Moreover, each additional piece of personally identifiable data 
that is online increases the chance that a thief can successfully thwart 
financial institutions’ identity theft detection systems and either steal 
money from customer accounts or acquire credit lines in their names. 
Already, these systems must regularly evolve to account for new kinds 
of data about individuals becoming available online. 
The subjective harms are more difficult to quantify. Individuals 
have different preferences for revealing factual information about 
themselves, but many prefer to keep financial information private. This 
preference may be rooted in security concerns, but for many it is more 
emotional—they are embarrassed about their financial situation or feel 
 
 347.  See supra Part II.A. 
 348.  H. Yoshiura, Re-Identifying People from Anonymous Histories of Their Activities, 2019 
IEEE 10TH INT’L CONF. ON AWARENESS SCI. & TECH. (ICAST), 2019, at 1, 3–4 (describing a 
mechanism for reidentifying anonymous data).  
 349.  There are ample cases of fraudsters using the land recording system to fraudulently 
convey land. See generally Lynden Griggs & Rouhshi Low, Identity Fraud and Land Registration 
Systems: An Australian Perspective, 75 CONV. & PROP. LAW. 285 (2011) (explaining the many 
forms of fraud facilitated by Australia’s land recording system).  
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less comfortable with neighbors and strangers knowing these details of 
their lives. 
One remedy is to make any public disclosure of personally 
identifiable information optional for consumers. This option may 
reduce the effectiveness of the formality but would help ensure the 
price of the additional protection makes sense on an individual level. 
To preserve the effectiveness of any public-facing formalities, 
regulators would need to monitor firms to ensure they do not nudge 
consumers towards opting out of disclosure.350 Otherwise, over time, 
the data might become too spotty for its availability to regulators, the 
media, and researchers to be meaningful. 
CONCLUSION 
Although much of this Article catalogs how and why consumers 
experience consistently poor contract servicing, it is cautiously 
optimistic. Servicing—firm-side contract performance—will never be 
perfect, but it is possible to plan for errors both to reduce their 
frequency and the scope of their harm when they inevitably occur. This 
Article identifies modularity and formalities as two systemic 
interventions to make contracts more error resilient. There may be 
others.  
In concluding, I want to spend a moment defending the choice to 
subject readers to dozens of pages of theory when a few lines of policy 
prescription could land this Article in more or less the same place. The 
answer is the theory is useful. It helps us think about contracts at a level 
of generality that accommodates change over time. Commentators 
have a good handle on the pathologies in consumer contracts today, 
but we do not know what pathologies will exist in the future. 
Regulations may remedy some pathologies at one point in time, but 
the consumer finance industry is creative. It will find a way around the 
regulation. This Article evinces a hope that searching for solutions to 
modern problems in longstanding theories of private law will provide 
more timeless solutions.  
Here, looking at the structure of consumer financial contracts 
through the theoretical frameworks of modularity and formalities 
reveals these agreements are almost written to maximize errors. It also 
suggests a way forward. This is not to say the law of consumer finance 
 
 350.  See generally Jamie Luguri & Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Shining a Light on Dark Patterns, 
13 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 43 (2021) (demonstrating the efficacy of dark patterns). 
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will ever be set-it-and-forget-it. Rather, these theoretical frameworks 
reveal new the levers available for making policy improvements. 
 
